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ABSTRACT 
Under IFRS 8, firms’ should provide financial segment disclosures that enable investors to assess the 
different sources of risk and income as management does. This sensitive information would also be 
available for competitors. The potential competitive harm may incentive firms to withhold segment 
information. However, the IASB believe that segment disclosure would improve. We aim to study the 
influence of competitive harm on the level of segment disclosures under IFRS 8 using a large sample 
of firms from EU. Empirical tests to our competitive harm model estimate the effect of three 
competitive harm proxies: abnormal profitability, industry concentration and labor power. The results 
showed a significant increase on the number of reportable business segments, but less significant for 
the number of key items. Estimation of the model, in pre and post period of IFRS 8 adoption, revealed 
that firms over performing their industry, operating in more concentrated industries and subject to 
higher labor power are still related to lower levels of segment disclosure on both periods. Furthermore, 
the results of the “change model2 showed that firms previously associated to abnormal profitability 
and labor power are statistically more related to the “no change” category than to the category 
representing firms that increased their disclosure. Overall the results seem to suggest that IFRS 8 had a 
low or a null effect in reducing non-disclosure due to proprietary costs motivations. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Segment reporting, on annual financial statements, is considered as one of the most relevant financial 
information for allowing investors and other interested parties, to access firms’ activities and 
desegregated performance. Several studies documented the importance of segment reporting in 
improving earnings prediction, risk assessment and general analysts’ forecasts (e.g. Ajinkya, 1980; 
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Baldwin, 1984; Hope et al., 2008). However, if segment reporting permits an improved inside view to 
how firms’ activities contribute to global performance, these entities face also a higher exposure to 
competitors. Concerns of competitive harm, from the disclosure of segment data, were frequent on 
responses to segment standards in the past and are still documented nowadays (IASB, 2013b). 
Therefore, the disclosure of proprietary information could likely have an effect on loss of 
competitiveness. This could be higher, for example, for firms showing abnormal profitability (to 
industry), operating in more concentrated industries or subject to powerful suppliers, which work as 
incentives for managers’ decisions to not, fully, desegregate their operations through business 
reportable segments. For this reason, the effect of competitive harm on segment disclosure has been 
studied since the first requirements of segment reporting and is considered a main issue within the 
proprietary costs theory (e.g. Hayes and Lundholm, 1996; Harris, 1998). Recently, the adoption of 
IFRS 8 in European Union (EU) was followed by some controversy. The IASB new standard was 
aligned with North American SFAS 131 and adopted the management approach, which states that 
external segment reporting should follow the same structure of the internal report reviewed 
periodically by the chief operating decision maker (CODM). Thus, this approach would improve 
external users to analyze firms’ performance through the eyes of management. Recent published 
papers (e.g. Nichols et al., 2012; Crawford et al., 2012), on segment reporting under IFRS 8, are 
essentially descriptive and based on measuring quantitative segment disclosures and in comparison to 
the same disclosures made under IAS 14R. Although its relevance, competitive harm influence on 
segment disclosure is yet to be estimated under the new requirements and consists in an important 
field of research to access IFRS 8 effect on this issue. Pisano and Landriani (2012) only examined the 
influence of one competitive harm proxy (industry concentration) and with a small sample of Italian 
listed firms. Therefore, our main objective is to estimate, if the relationship of competitive harm and 
lower segment reporting still persists with IFRS 8 adoption, using a larger sample and a more 
complete empirical model. We used segment data collected from Worldscope database and a sample 
of 1997 non-financial listed firms from 13 countries. Our empirical research was divided in three 
research questions. First, we performed a descriptive analysis on business segment reporting presented 
on the new and previous standard, detecting significant changes. Secondly, we test for the persistence 
of competitive harm in the last period of IAS 14R, using three main proxies, abnormal profitability, 
industry concentration and labor power. If previous literature confirmed the practice of discretionary 
disclosure on segment reporting due to the influence of competitive harm, this evidence is based on 
financial data provided by firms more than a decade ago. Finally, in the third research question we 
apply the same model for segment disclosures under IFRS 8 and in order to estimate if this 
relationship still persists. In addition we estimate a multinomial regression model (change model) to 
check if firms that changed their levels of business segmentation, were those likely under the previous 
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negative influence of competitive harm. Results of t-tests for mean comparison evidenced a significant 
increase in the number of reportable segments, with a general decline in single-segment firms. 
Evidence on the disclosure of key items was mixed and a significant declined was documented in the 
average number of items, disclosed by each multi-segment firms. The majority of sample firms did not 
change their level of business segment disclosure. The estimation of the competitive harm model 
revealed an overall negative relationship between all competitive harm proxies and the level of 
business segment disclosure on both periods of analysis. In general, results suggest that, under IFRS 8, 
EU firms performing better than industry mean, acting in more concentrated industries or subject to a 
higher pressure from labor suppliers, are still withholding important segment information to investors 
and other users, especially due to concerns on competitive harm. The results, for the multinomial 
regression model analyzing how the different categories of change are associated to previous non-
disclosure due to competitive harm, showed that firms, where the number of business segments grew, 
were significantly less related to abnormal profitability and labor power, than firms that did not 
change. We also documented a significant association to abnormal profitability growth on firms that 
declined their level of business items per segment. Overall, evidence suggests that the new standard 
had a null effect (or of lower significance) in reducing such relation, while on the other hand, 
comments to the post-implementation review of IFRS 8 are concerned on the persistence of segment 
aggregation. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
 
2.1. IFRS 8: The Adoption of the Management Approach by the IASB 
As a result of the joint convergence project with the FASB, in November 2006, the IASB issued IFRS 
8 - "Operating Segments" that would definitively replace IAS 14R on firms adopting IAS/IFRS in the 
periods beginning on or after 1 January 2009 (IFRS 8, §35). With the new international segment 
reporting standard, the “risks and returns approach” for identifying firms’ external structure of 
segmentation was replaced by the “management approach” as described in the north-American SFAS 
131. Its basis is generically defined in the §5 of IFRS 8 that establishes as primary source of 
segmentation, the same format used in the internal reporting system regularly reviewed by the entity’s 
CODM. The reportable segments referred as "Operating Segments” should allow investor to access 
firms’ performance “through the eyes of management”. Despite several concerns, the IASB adopted 
the “management approach” stating, among other reasons, that this approach would enable users to see 
the entity as management does or, that firms under this approach showed greater number of reported 
segments and provided a higher quantity of segment information. The IASB based its decision in the 
fact that most comments to the exposure draft were in favor of the new standard and also, in the 
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findings from academic studies, such as Street et al. (2000) and Street and Nichols (2002) that, 
respectively, analyzed SFAS 131 and IAS 14R implementation. 
 
Our research is based on a sample of EU firms. The endorsement of IFRS 8 in EU was a controversial 
process, with many positions against or concerned in the use of the management approach. The 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) of the European Parliament (EP) expressed 
their concerns on the adoption of IFRS 8 in Europe and opposed the standard, calling the European 
Commission (EC) to urgently carry out a study to its potential impact before endorsing the standard 
(EC, 2007). One of those concerns stated that the new approach would permit firms to define 
operating segments as management finds suitable (discretionary disclosure) and which furthermore 
requires less mandatory disclosure on line of items2. The EC conducted a public consultation on the 
endorsement of IFRS 8 and in September 2007 released its conclusions on the report “Endorsement of 
IFRS 8 Operating Segments: Analysis of Potential Effects”. The report documented that the majority 
of consultants were in favor of IFRS 8 and a positive cost-benefit relation should be expected. The EC 
report leaded, on the November 2007, to the adoption of IFRS 8 in EU for the year 2009. EU firms 
should then, identify their operating segments in accordance with IFRS 8. This should be the main 
basis of firms’ external segment reporting, which may include also segment information at a 
secondary level and defined as “entity-wide disclosures”. Recently the IASB conducted their first 
post-implementation review, which related to IFRS 8 adoption analysis. The main results are 
presented in the literature review section. 
 
2.2. Literature Review  
The first studies, after the adoption of a segment reporting standard, were usually focused on a 
quantity analysis to the new segment disclosures and to the magnitude of changes. Studies like Street 
et al. (2000), Hermann and Thomas (2000) or Berger and Hann (2003) documented changes on 
segment reporting with the introduction of SFAS 131 “management approach”. Results showed a 
significant increase on the average number of reported segments, with a decline on single-segment 
firms. Most studies also documented an upgrade in the number of key items, but revealed concerns on 
the increase differences in the disclosed profit measures. Studying the implementation of IAS 14R, 
similar results were detected by Street and Nichols (2002) and Prather-Kinsey and Meek (2004) for 
the increase in the number of reported segments and in the number of disclosed items. These papers 
                                                             
2 The number of items, to be disclosed by each reportable segment, is almost the same on both standards (IAS 
14R and IFRS 8). However, concerns were raised on the potential decline of items disclosure, essentially due to 
the fact that most of requirements are only mandatory if those items are regularly reported internally to CODM. 
In addition, there were some concerns that firms could manage their internal reports in order to avoid external 
disclosure (e.g. EP, 2007). 
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identified however that, a significant part of the firms, still presented an important level of non-
compliance. Recently the focus of research was centered in the implementation of IFRS 8 and findings 
on the effect of the new standard are discussed later on. After some maturity in standards adoption, 
investigators focus their attention to achieve evidence on the economic effects of the new segment 
disclosures, which is normally identified as a different stream of research. Most literature covered the 
effect of segmenting reporting standards in the US and almost found that the new segment information 
improving analysts’ predictions (e.g. Nichols, 1995; Behn et al., 2002; Hope et al., 2008; Hope et al., 
2009). Empirical models confirmed that new segment reporting produced changes in analysts and 
market expectations (Berger and Hann, 2003; Ettredge et al., 2005).  
 
Despite analyzing the effect of a new standard, researchers are equally concern on the practice of 
discretionary disclosure. Since segment reporting increases the exposure of firms’ activities and their 
performance to the market, managers may be motivated for conditioning segment disclosures to avoid 
agency costs and proprietary costs. This increased exposure may, for example, result in higher 
monitoring from shareholders (e.g. Berger and Hann, 2003) or in higher competitive harm (e.g. Harris, 
1998). Thus, historically this has been, also, an important stream of research that is yet to further 
explore under the adoption of IFRS 8. Aligned with our objective of research we detail previous 
literature on competitive harm and segment reporting in a specific section.  
 
Literature Review of Changes in the Level of Segment Reporting with IFRS 8 
In July 2013, the IASB published a report and feedback statement of its post-implementation review to 
IFRS 8. This report included the results from an extensive review of academic research and similar 
literature to date. Nichols et al. (2012) paper was pointed as the most relevant cross-country published 
study and examined IFRS 8 adoption on blue chip firms from 14 European countries (335 firms). The 
others published papers were based on a single country analysis. Crawford et al. (2012) examined 
IFRS 8 adoption on UK firms, Kang and Gray (2013) on the Australian firms, Mardini et al. (2012) on 
the Jordanian firms and finally Pisano and Landriani (2012) examined segment reporting on Italian 
firms. Relevant working papers were also analyzed and we may find studies with significant larger 
samples, as in the case of Bugeja et al. (2012), which analyzes changes on segment reporting of 1.617 
Australian firms. There were also some working papers trying to link the new segment disclosures and 
to their effect on capital markets (e.g. information asymmetry, value relevance or analysts forecast 
accuracy) (IASB, 2013a). Recently, Nichols et al. (2013) published a paper reviewing literature of 
segment reporting under the adoption of the “management approach” of SFAS 131 and IFRS 8. The 
conclusions of research on IFRS 8 are in line with those analyzed in the post-implementation review. 
Non-academic research was also discussed on the IASB, as is the case of the European Securities and 
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Markets Authority (ESMA), which in 2011 published the report “Review of European enforcers on the 
implementation of IFRS 8 – Operating Segments”. The report covers the analysis of financial 
statements from 118 firms of 9 European countries.  
 
Results from Nichols et al. (2012) showed that, in almost all analyzed countries, the number of 
reportable segments increased on the primary format of report. Total average increased from 3,84 to 
4,19 segments per firm and the t-tests revealed that average change was statistically significant. 
However, if this positive change was related to 27% of sample firms that increased their number of 
segments, the magnitude of such change was attenuated by a documented decline on 11% of firms. 
The majority of firms did not change their number of segments, which was also the general evidence 
on other studies. Results from Crawford et al. (2012) on UK listed firms confirmed the overall 
increase on reported segments mean. The mean on the number of segments increased on all typologies 
of segments with business segmentation showing a significant increase for a 5% level of significance. 
The average on business segmentation increased from 3,30 to 3,56 segments per firm. Pisano and 
Landriani (2012) documented on Italian listed firms that the average of reportable segments faced a 
minor increase from 3,71 to 3,85 segments per firm. In fact, 75% of the sample did not change their 
number of reportable segments. Kang and Gray (2013) or Mardini et al. (2012) also achieved evidence 
of an increase on reportable segments of Australian and Jordanian firms, respectively. In comparison 
with the impact of the management approach in the US (SFAS 131 adoption), IFRS 8 studies show a 
larger percentage of firms that did not change, which could be attributed to the fact that many of these 
firms already adopted the management approach under the suggestion of IAS 14R (Nichols et al., 
2013). Equally, the potential enforcement on IAS 14R adoption, in the last years, could have resulted 
in the consistently improvement of segment reporting. Hence, the expected benefits of adopting the 
management approach, could already, have been partially materialized with the application of IAS 
14R (Nichols et al., 2013).      
 
One of the main objectives of segment reporting standard-setters was the reduction of firms that stated 
to be single-segment and therefore did not present any desegregation of segment information. In 
general, the papers addressing this question found a decline on single-segment firms and normally of 
low impact (IASB, 2013a). The research of Nichols et al. (2012) evidenced a decline from 23 to 20 
single-segment firms with IFRS 8 adoption. The lower documented effect may be associated to the 
characteristics of the sample that in most cases was based on larger listed firms and thereby less likely 
to be single-segment. For example, using a larger sample of Australian firms (1.617) Bugeja et al. 
(2012) identified a more representative decline (of 12%) in the number of single-segment firms. 
Nevertheless, ESMA (2011) reported that analysts considered that firms still minimize the number of 
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reportable segments in the notes of financial statements, through aggregation, in order to avoid 
providing meaningful information.     
 
“When IFRS 8 was issued, some investors were concerned that key segment information would not be 
reported unless it was regularly reviewed by the CODM” (IASB, 2013:19a). Confirming these 
concerns, Nichols et al. (2012) found a significant decrease on the average number of reported items 
on the primary format of report. The majority of required items faced a decrease on their number, with 
a statistical significant decline on the disclosure of segment liabilities, equity method income and 
equity method investment, and also capital expenditures. In contrast, new items mentioned in IFRS 8, 
like interest revenue and interest expense showed an increase, which was however less significant. 
Similar results are provided by Crawford et al. (2012) on UK listed firms. On the other hand, Kang 
and Gray (2013) and Pisano and Landriani (2012) documented an increase on average number of 
items per segment. Globally, the evidence is mixed, with many studies showing a decrease on a 
relevant part of required items. For example, working papers like Bugeja et al. (2012) and 
Weissenberger and Franzen (2012) showed that under IFRS 8 the Australian and German firms 
reported fewer line items. These results seem to highlight the concerns on the potential decline in 
segment key items, which may have an effect of reducing the usefulness of segment reporting 
(Crawford et al., 2012; Nichols et al, 2013).  
 
Research on Competitive Harm and Segment Reporting 
The FASB (2001) listed three factors for determining if information may lead to competitive 
disadvantages: the type of information, the level of detail, and the timing of the disclosure. This should 
be the case of external disclosure of segment data, which introduces in firms’ financial statements 
detailed proprietary information3 of their activities. Thus, if segment reporting gives vital and more 
detailed financial information on firms’ activities and of their key accounting and financial items, 
proprietary costs may likely arise from such disclosures4. These proprietary costs are manly related to 
competitive harm. For example, the exposure of key financial information to competitors could result 
in competitive disadvantages, but equally may put the firm at a disadvantage in negotiations with 
costumers or suppliers (including labor suppliers). In addition, the disclosure of segment data 
(proprietary information) may also result in other conflicting situations and as a consequence in 
additional proprietary costs. For example, Véron (2007) referred to the importance of geographical 
segment disclosures for non-financial stakeholders, such as non-governmental organizations or 
                                                             
3 Dye (1986:331) defined proprietary information as the “information whose disclosure reduces the present value 
of cash-flows of the firm endowed with the information”. 
4 Equally, the timing of disclosure is an increasing relevant issue, since the active SFAS 131 and the new IFRS 8 
demanded higher disclosure requirements for interim financial reports. 
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corporate social responsibility observers. Furthermore, Verrecchia (1983) refer to the potential costs of 
providing proprietary information in certain politically sensitive industries. Thereby, when facing 
proprietary costs, firms are likely more motivated to withhold segment information and practice 
discretionary disclosure. Verrecchia (1983) argues that proprietary costs assumptions bring noise to 
the reasons why managers may practice discretionary disclosure, since they extend motivation for 
withholding information in the presence of “good news”. In 1996 and in line with proprietary costs 
theory, two theoretical models were published with the initial focus on competitive harm that could 
result from showing segment information to competitors. Hayes and Lundholm (1996) developed a 
model to determine how firms choose the adequate level of aggregation in segmental disclosures, 
since that information is observed by both, competitors and capital market. They showed that under 
severe competition, firms’ value should be higher if segment aggregation is performed. Nagarajan and 
Sridhar (1996) discusses that mandatory segment reporting may reduce value-relevant information of 
financial disclosures, if it exposes (with a higher transparency) a firm to material proprietary costs. 
They argued that, when segment disclosures became mandatory, the firm may tend to aggregate value-
relevant information to protect and avoid a potential entry of a rival.  
 
Empirical research on the effect of proprietary costs in segment disclosures was, at first, essentially 
based on evidence from US listed Firms. Following the assumptions of Hayes and Lundholm (1996), 
Harris (1998) developed an empirical model to validate competition effect on segment reporting 
choices, i.e. on managers’ decision to disclose firms’ operations as business segments. Harris (1998) 
argues that, managers may seem reluctant to provide segment disclosures from operations in less 
competitive industries (highly concentrated industries) when firms present high abnormal earnings 
(performance superior to industry mean). Results showed that, in less competitive industries, measured 
by industry concentration and speed of profit adjustment, firms’ operations are less likely to be 
reported as segments. The transition from SFAS 14 to SFAS 131 was an important field for testing the 
previously influence of competitive harm on lower segment disclosures. Botosan and Stanford (2005) 
research had the main objective of achieving evidence on manager’s motivation to withhold segment 
information, using a sample of single-segment firms under SFAS 14, which started to disaggregate 
segment data under SFAS 131. Empirical results suggested that hidden segments of “change firms” 
operated in less competitive industries than their primary industries, which is line with previous 
papers. On the other hand, the “change firms” group showed, in average, profitable hidden segments, 
but at a firm-level those firms were less profitable. This result suggested that these firms masked their 
abnormal profitability in order to avoid competitive harm.  Another paper from Ettredge et al. (2006) 
analyzed the effect of SFAS 131 in reducing the practice of lower segment disclosures due to 
competitive harm concerns, but through the use of a different measure of segment information 
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relevance. More specifically they looked at improvement on the cross-segment variability of reported 
profits by multi-segment firms. Like Botosan and Harris (2005) they used industry concentration and 
abnormal profitability as proxies for competitive harm. The estimation of the empirical model 
evidenced a negative relationship between both, abnormal profitability and industry concentration, 
with a higher disclosure on cross-segment variability of profits. However, using coefficient shift from 
the pre to the post SFAS 131 period, the results did not evidence that the decline on the negative 
association was statistically significant. Also based on SFAS 131 adoption, the paper of Berger and 
Hann (2007) discusses mangers motivation to aggregate business segments in order to protect 
abnormal profits due to, both, agency and proprietary costs. They estimate the influence of both 
motivations, based on their relation to new segments disclosed under SFAS 131. The results for the 
competitive harm proxies (industry concentration and abnormal profit) documented a positive 
relationship to the new segments, but not statistically significant. In the same line of Berger and Hann 
(2007), a more recent study from Bens et al. (2011) investigated aggregation in external segment 
reporting through the use of confidential plant-level (manufacturing establishments) data from Census 
Bureau database. Using plant-level data, where information of firms’ activities is less aggregated, they 
identified reportable “pseudo-segments” and compared to those reported on external segment 
disclosures. The disclosure or non-disclosure of the pseudo-segment was therefore tested to proxies of 
agency and proprietary costs motives. The database used by Bens et al. (2011) allowed them to 
compute new proprietary costs variables. They suggest that firms, presenting themselves as single-
segment, withhold segment information, when they face a higher number of private competitors. The 
evidence on multi-segment firms also confirmed that speed of abnormal profits adjustment and labor 
power were negatively related to pseudo-segment disclosure. Bens et al. (2011) introduced also a 
control variable for industry concentration ratio, based on firms’ higher entry barriers and lower 
product substitutability, which should attenuate competitive harm concerns. The results however, were 
not statistically significant. 
 
Since IASB standards were adopted worldwide, research is likely more dispersed if we compare to the 
scope of FASB application (US listed firms). As a consequence, some of those papers are published in 
native language and in less available journals. Prior to IFRS 8 adoption we identified the studies of 
Leuz (2004) on German listed firms and the paper of Nichols and Street (2007) based in a 
multinational sample. Leuz (2004) examined the influence of proprietary costs on the level of 
voluntary segment disclosure before its mandatory adoption in 1999. The author estimated the 
determinants of voluntary segment disclosure in the scope of proprietary costs theory. Then, the same 
analysis was performed for voluntary cash-flow statements as a benchmarking for non-proprietary 
disclosure and whose differences to voluntary segment data model would highlight the effect of 
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proprietary costs in segment disclosures. With a sample of 109 non-financial listed firms, their 
econometric models were based on logit and ordered probit regression models, depending how the 
dependent variable was measured. Leuz (2004) used different levels of segment disclosure based on 
five key items (sales, operating income, assets, capital expenditures and depreciation). Abnormal 
profitability was used as proxy for proprietary costs and entry barriers, measured by capital intensity, 
used as control variable. Evidence showed a negative relation between abnormal profitability and 
voluntary segment disclosure. In opposition firms with higher entry barriers were related to higher 
disclosure. The results also showed that segment disclosure was more related to proprietary costs than 
cash-flow disclosure (benchmark for non-proprietary information). As for the paper of Nichols and 
Street (2007), it examined the effect of competition measured by firm abnormal profitability and under 
the adoption of IAS 14R. In particular, they had the objective to investigate the influence of industry 
level of competition on managers’ decision to conceal segment financial information of the different 
industries where the firm operated. The multinational sample consisted in 160 firms that adopted IAS 
14R between 1999 and 2002. The measure for the level of segment reporting was based on Harris 
(1998) model and therefore, it represented a dummy variable, identifying if firms operations were 
coincident, or not, with the business reportable segments. Estimation of the logistic regression model 
confirmed that, abnormal profitability was negatively associated to firms’ decision in disclosing their 
operations as business segments, which is evidence in line with studies performed on US listed firms. 
More recently the paper from Katselas et al. (2011) examined the association between the two main 
competitive harm proxies and firms lobbying positions on ED 8. The results revealed mixed evidence 
on the expected association that abnormal profitable firms were less supportive of ED 8. Only, when 
an interaction term of industry concentration and abnormal profitability was included in the model, the 
hypothesis was confirmed. The interaction variable showed to be negatively related to ED 8 support. 
The validity of the model is however limited by the use of a relative small sample of 27 firms. Finally, 
we found one study addressing the issue of competition and segment disclosures under IFRS 8. The 
paper of Pisano and Landriani (2012) showed a first attempt to examine this historical relationship 
based on 124 Italian listed firms. Competitive harm is only estimated using the association of industry 
concentration (measured by Herfindahl index and the four-firm concentration ratio) with a level of 
disclosure based on 23 segment items and with growth percentage of the segment disclosure from 
2008 to 2009. In line with proprietary costs theory, they stated that Italian firms operating in high 
(less) competitive industries are likely associated with higher (lower) segment disclosures. They also 
theorized that firms where competition is higher (lower), should be positively (negatively) related to a 
variation in their level of segment disclosure. Results of the regression model, confirmed the 
hypothesis for industry concentration. Using the Herfindahl index the results are statistical significant 
at a 10% level. In alternative, the estimation with the four-firm concentration ratio revealed to be 
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statistical significant at a 5% level of significance. The additional estimation for the variance on the 
level of segment disclosure showed a negative relation between industry concentration and the 
increase of segment disclosure score. However, this negative relation had no statistical relevance using 
the Herfindahl index and revealed to be significant with the four-firm concentration ratio, but only at a 
10% level of significance.  
 
Pisano and Landriani (2012) recognized some limitation of their research, essentially related to sample 
size and its restriction to Italian firms, but also by not exploring other effects that could influence 
managers’ behavior on the decision of disclosing segment information. In the present paper we 
address the issue of competitive harm with a more complete model, using different proxies, which are 
estimated for a significant larger sample of 13 European countries. We also improve the analysis on 
segment reporting variance using new control variables and by estimating the effect of IFRS 8 through 
a multinomial regression model. 
 
2.3. Research Questions and Hypotheses Development 
The main objective of our research is to explore proprietary costs theory based on firms’ potential 
competitive harm from disclosing, separately, proprietary information about their operations. More 
specifically, we analyze the effect of competitive harm on the level of segment disclosures under IFRS 
8. In the previous sections we reviewed segment reporting research and the process of adoption of the 
new standard. From post-implementation review of IFRS 8, we highlight two aspects that support our 
research objective. First, the report of IASB, on July 2013, identified the loss of competitiveness due 
to segment disclosures, especially on smaller firms listed in smaller capital markets, as one of the 
major concerns pointed out by respondents to IFRS 8 review process, while investors were also 
concerned on segment aggregation. This confirms the results of Katselas et al. (2011), which 
suggested that firms subject to higher competitive pressure made lobbying against the adoption of 
IFRS 8. Secondly, studies collected by the IASB to the implementation of IFRS 8 were essentially 
descriptive and the effect of industry competition on the level of disclosure was not sufficiently 
explored (IASB, 2013a). In fact, research based on IAS/IFRS, did not cover a sufficiently combination 
of competitive harm proxies, as for example, the influence of labor suppliers. Additionally, the 
relationship between competitive harm and segment disclosures has been documented on the adoption 
of previous accounting standards, mainly based on US evidence or through the analysis of an 
individual country applying IAS 14R. Despite the Pisano and Landriani (2012) study, previous 
researches (e.g. Berger and Hann, 2007; Nichols and Street, 2007) were based on segment information 
provided by firms for over a decade ago. The adoption of IFRS 8 was a controversial process in EU 
and for some entities the expected positive effect of the standard was not clear (EC, 2007; Véron, 
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2007). However, the majority believed that IFRS 8 would increase the quantity and quality of segment 
reporting. IASB recent analysis to academic research on IFRS 8 identified, in general and as expected, 
an increase in segment disclosures. Yet, it would be equally important to research if this new available 
segment data has any relationship to firms that previously showed lower levels of disclosure and were 
associated to competitive harm pressures. If IFRS 8 was applied according to its objectives, a higher 
level of segment disclosure and transparency may likely reveal previous hidden disclosure practices, 
including from firms subjected to competitive harm.  
 
As a response to these literature gaps, our investigation develops an extended model to estimate, under 
IFRS 8, the relationship between the level of business segment disclosures and competitive harm. The 
regression model combines three competitive harm proxies, in particular, abnormal profitability, 
industry concentration and labor power. We equally aim to explore if positive change on segment 
reporting, from IAS 14R to IFRS 8, has any relationship to firms previously associated to non-
disclosure. For this purpose we developed a multinomial regression model. Our research contributes 
also to literature due to sample size and by including in the analysis, small listed EU firms that are 
likely more sensitive to competition pressures. To achieve these objectives, we organized the research 
questions in the following manner:  
(1) Did the adoption of IFRS 8 result in a significant change on business segment disclosure? 
(2) Does competitive harm still influence the level of business segment disclosure in the period 
previous to IFRS 8 adoption? 
(3) Was competitive harm influence, on the level of business segment disclosure, maintained 
under IFRS 8 adoption? 
 
Research Question 1: Change on Business Segment Reporting with IFRS 8 Adoption  
Since we aim to estimate the effect of IFRS 8 in declining non-disclosure of segment information due 
to competitive harm reasons, the first research question should provide a descriptive analysis of 
business segment reporting quantity, in the pre and post period of IFRS 8 adoption, allowing us to 
identify changes. Statistically, the application of t-tests for mean comparison should determine the 
significance of identified changes on business segment reporting. These would be the first evidence on 
the effect of the new standard in improving, or not, segment disclosures. As discussed in literature 
review section, recent papers, with emphasis to Nichols et al. (2012), examined IFRS 8 adoption and 
found evidence of an overall increase on the total amount of segment information. Therefore, and 
aligned with IASB expectations and previous literature general findings, we expect, with IFRS 8, that 
our sample of EU listed firms would reveal a significant increase on the number of reportable business 
segments and would decline the number of single-segment firms. As for the disclosure of items per 
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segment, literature evidenced mixed results (Nichols et al., 2012; Crawford et al., 2012) and therefore 
we may expect also different behaviors on our sample firms. As Crawford et al. (2012) stated, if the 
average number of segment disclosures increases with IFRS 8, a greater disaggregation of financial 
consolidated data based in business and geographical operations, is being provided to users, which 
may support previous arguments defending improvements of IAS 14R. On the contrary, the negative 
change may sustain those who revealed against or concerned about the adoption of “management 
approach”. However, and assuming that positive change occurred, such results would only confirm the 
significance of reported differences in the quantity of segment disclosures. This evidence does not 
clarify if changes were related to firms that previously practiced non-disclosure due to competitive 
harm.  
Research Question 2: Competitive Harm and the Level of Business Segment Disclosure Previous to 
IFRS 8 Adoption 
This research question, despite contributing to literature by updating evidence on the relationship 
between competitive harm and lower levels of segment disclosure in a more actual period, is also an 
essential requirement to check, on research question 3, the effect that IFRS 8 might had in encouraging 
firms that withhold information due to this fact. This potential effect of IFRS 8 assumes that 
competitive harm is still conditioning segment disclosure in the last period of IAS 14R. For this 
purpose we employ a regression model labelled as “competitive harm model” based on three main 
hypotheses, representing proprietary costs motivations to withhold segment information.  
 
As documented, industry concentration and abnormal profitability were the two main competitive 
harm proxies used in previous literature. These proxies represent firms’ competitive environment that 
may lead to proprietary costs due to the disclosure of segment information. The costs should be higher 
for firms operating in more concentrated industries (less competitive) and showing higher profitability 
in relation to industry mean. We identified also the use of other proxies for competitive harm, such as 
speed of abnormal profits adjustment, labor power, entry barriers, major customers, or private 
competitors. Of these competitive harm proxies, we are unable to use the variables for private 
competitors (non-listed competitors) and major customers, since information was not available for EU 
listed firms and in Worldscope database. Additionally, we will not use the proprietary costs proxy 
based on the speed of abnormal profit adjustment of Harris (1998). Computing this variable would 
require the calculation of abnormal profitability (firm and industry measures) persistence through 
several years. Due to the temporal limitation of our analysis, we do not estimate this proxy and 
therefore it is not included in our model. This reason was equally pointed by other researchers, when 
analyzing the replacement of a segment reporting standard in a limited period (e.g., Nichols and Street, 
2007). Thus, we estimate in our model the effect of abnormal profitability, industry concentration, 
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labor power, entry barriers and an additional variable representing industries with a single firm 
(monopolistic industry). Although related to competitive harm, the last two work as control variables, 
as we will further explain. Thus, abnormal profitability, industry concentration and labor power are 
defined as our three main hypotheses of the model and for all we expect a negative association to the 
levels of segment disclosure.  
 
Firms’ abnormal profitability is a proxy for higher exposition to competitive harm. In this 
environment, firms are likely, more associated to non-disclosure and to potentially hide their profitable 
activities. Abnormal profitability is also known as profitability adjusted to industry, and represents the 
difference between firms’ profitability and the industry mean for the same measure. We assume 
abnormal profitability as a positive difference, which indicates that a given firm had a performance 
superior to its industry. Several studies demonstrated that abnormal profitability is factor influencing 
managers to practice discretionary disclosure on firms’ segment reporting (e.g. Leuz, 2004; Botosan 
and Stanford, 2005; Nichols and Street, 2007). Thus, we hypothesize that firms with higher abnormal 
profitability are associated to a lower level of business segment disclosure in the previous period to 
IFRS 8 adoption. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Firms with abnormal profitability should be negatively related to the level of 
business segment disclosure in the previous period to IFRS 8 adoption.   
 
Proprietary costs theory argued that firms acting in less competitive industries (concentrated 
industries) are likely associated with withholding relevant segment information (e.g., Harris, 1998; 
Botosan and Harris, 2005; Ettredge et al., 2006; Berger and Hann, 2007; Pisano and Landriani, 2012). 
This was probably the most tested proxy for competitive harm due to the disclosure of proprietary 
information. Harris (1998) argues that firms face competitive harm due to the risk of disclosing 
sensitive information to stronger rivals, which may reduce their market share and profitability. This is 
especially accentuated in more imperfect industries, where the level of concentration is higher. In 
industries with few competitors, a higher dispersion between firms’ sizes could represent a highly 
imperfect competition and therefore the risk of competitive harm due to exposure of performance is 
higher for smaller firms. In the recent post-implementation review of IFRS 8 (IASB, 2013b), it was 
recognized that smaller listed firms operating in small markets face increase competitive harm, which 
as we discussed, may come from larger incumbent firms or new competitors. Our second hypothesis 
examines the effect of industry concentration on lower segment disclosure, in the period previous to 
IFRS 8 and after an increase maturity of EU firms on IAS 14R adoption.  
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Hypothesis 1b: Firms acting in more concentrated industries should be negatively related to the 
level of business segment disclosure in the previous period to IFRS 8 adoption.   
 
Proprietary costs may also arise from the potential decline on bargain power with customers or 
suppliers, such as the suppliers of labor. Firms with higher labor weight in their structure may want to 
avoid exposure of their business to employees or labor unions, for example, by not separating 
profitable activities from other not so profitable. However, and as discussed by Bens et al. (2011), 
previous literature gave little attention to the effect of labor power on the practice of discretionary 
disclosure. Bens et al. (2011) addresses this issue on their model and found a negative relationship 
between the weight of labor and the probability of firms’ operations to be disclosed as business 
segment. This variable is yet to be studied, in the scope of IASB segment reporting based research, as 
a proxy for competitive harm. Thus, we include it in our model, assuming that firms where the labor 
power is higher, managers may face an incentive to avoid full segment disclosure practices. A 
negative association is expected between the weight of labor costs and our level of business segment 
disclosure. 
 
Hypothesis 1c: Firms with higher labor power should be negatively related to the level of business 
segment disclosure in the previous period to IFRS 8 adoption.   
 
Research Question 3: The Effect of IFRS 8 on Competitive Harm Influence in Segment Reporting 
In the first research question we expect to provide evidence consistent with an overall increase on 
segment reporting after the introduction of IFRS 8. On the other hand, our second research question 
should evidence that, in the last period of IAS 14 adoption, potential harm from an adverse 
competitive environment, was still a factor related to lower levels of business segment disclosure. 
Thus, if hypotheses from our first tests are confirmed, we should now fulfill our main objectives of 
research and achieve evidence that would answer the following questions:  
 Is competitive harm, under the adoption of IFRS 8, still related to lower levels of business 
segment disclosure? 
 Did IFRS 8 had any positive effect on declining this association, encouraging higher 
disclosure on previously constrained firms?  
 
First evidence of IFRS 8 effect, in reducing non-disclosure on firms subject to competitive harm, 
should result from replicating the competitive harm regression model used on previous research 
question. As discussed, although the expected general increases on disclosure, we may expect that, 
with IFRS 8, competitive harm still has an influence on segment reporting. Katselas et al. (2011), 
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studding lobbying positions on ED 8, identified that firms showing abnormal profits and acting in less 
competitive industries were related to non-support of the new standard. More recently, Pisano and 
Landriani (2012) found that industry concentration kept its negative association to the level of segment 
disclosure under IFRS 8 adoption. Nevertheless, they studied competitive harm influence based on, 
only one competition proxy and for a small sample of Italian listed firms. Additionally, the recent 
post-implementation review on IFRS 8 identified that some firms are still concerned on the 
commercial sensitivity of segment disclosures (IASB, 2013b). Thereby, recent literature seems to 
suggest that competitive harm influence may still persisted, even after IFRS 8.  
 
In order to estimate this persistence, we use our competitive harm model to the level of business 
segment disclosure in 2009, considering the assumptions defined on research question 2. We kept the 
same prediction sign on our hypotheses in order to enhance the comprehension on competitive harm 
effect and turn comparison easier.  
Hypothesis 2a: Firms with abnormal profitability should be negatively related to the level of 
business segment disclosure under IFRS 8 adoption.   
Hypothesis 2b: Firms acting in more concentrated industries should be negatively related to the 
level of business segment disclosure under IFRS 8 adoption.   
Hypothesis 2c: Firms with higher labor power should be negatively related to the level of business 
segment disclosure under IFRS 8 adoption.   
 
If results exhibit that the significant negative relationship between competitive harm proxies and the 
level of business segment disclosure is maintained, it could represent primary evidence that IFRS 8 
was unsuccessful on improving disclosure of firms subject to this environment. Otherwise, if those 
proxies revealed a non-statistical significance, it may induce that IFRS 8 likely resulted as an incentive 
to higher disclosure on these particularly firms. Overall, the results should evidence the persistence, or 
not, of lower segment disclosures associated to competitive harm, but are limited to explain the effect 
of the new standard. For example, if a general increase is expected in segment reporting, literature also 
evidenced that some firms declined their levels of segmentation, which may introduce some noise to 
the effect of IFRS 85. Thus, on the next section we construct a regression model with a dependent 
variable representing the different firm position on segment reporting change. We apply a multinomial 
regression model to estimate if firms that increased their level of segment disclosure were associated 
                                                             
5 In literature there were some concerns on managers concealing internal segment information in order to control 
and aggregate their segment disclosures. If aggregation happened, the effect of IFRS 8 should have led to 
negative change, which may bias our results for increase disclosure factors. For example, in line with these 
concerns, firms associated to abnormal profitability may explore the management approach to withhold segment 
disclosures instead of moving to a higher level of reporting. 
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to previous competitive harm variables, while controlling for other factors that may have influenced 
change. As an example, results should evidence if positive changing firms, in the previous period of 
new standard adoption, were associated with higher abnormal profitability or acted in more 
concentrated industries. If so, the results may suggest that IFRS 8 had some success in improving 
segment reporting on these firms. In contrast, a negative association to positive change would reveal 
that IFRS 8 was unable to reduce this problem. Literature testing for change and competitive harm is 
essentially concentrated in US evidence and on firms that shift from single-segment to multi-segment 
(Botosan and Stanford, 2005; Berger and Hann, 2007). Berger and Hann (2007) explored higher 
abnormal profitability and industry concentration as related to new reportable segments under SFAS 
131, which were not disclosed in the previous SFAS 14. Their research, gave priority to the agency 
costs motive to non-disclosure (firms hiding poor performance segments). Low evidence was found 
for proprietary costs proxies in association to change, i.e. to new segments under SFAS 131. Instead, 
Botosan and Stanford (2005) through a comparative analysis found statistical evidence that new 
segments were related to higher abnormal profitability and industry concentration. Recently, Pisano 
and Landriani (2012) analyzed the variance of disclosed items per segment, from IAS 14R to IFRS 8, 
and results showed a negative and statistical association to industry concentration, but only within a 
10% level of significance. Despite the focus on positive change, we should also contribute to literature 
through the use of a multinomial regression model that considers all categories of change. This 
methodology would help us to isolate firms that had a positive change from those that declined their 
level of business segmentation, without excluding any category from the model. In fact, the separation 
of “increase and decrease firms” is important to better access the reasons behind each change 
behavior. Thus, using multinomial regression model we may estimate the association of our 
independent variables for firms that increased disclosures separately from those that declined. We 
designate this regression model as the “change model”  
 
In research question 2 we assumed that, in the period previous to adoption of IFRS 8, firms associated 
to higher abnormal profitability, industry concentration and labor power, showed lower levels of 
segment disclosure. If these hypotheses are confirmed, we expect that firms with an increase on their 
disclosures should be related to those that held segment disclosures due to concerns on loss of 
competitiveness. Therefore, we estimate the association to change using firms’ position on competitive 
harm, in the period previous to IFRS 8 adoption. The hypotheses for testing change and the effect of 
IFRS 8 would require the multinomial “change model” to include abnormal profitability, industry 
concentration and labor power measured under IAS 14R adoption. Hypotheses are stated in a positive 
way: 
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Hypothesis 3a: Firms with abnormal profitability in the period previous to IFRS 8 adoption should 
be positively related to an increase on the level of business segment disclosure.   
Hypothesis 3b: Firms acting in more concentrated industries in the period previous to IFRS 8 
adoption should be positively related to an increase on the level of business segment disclosure.   
Hypothesis 3c: Firms with higher labor power in the period previous to IFRS 8 adoption should be 
positively related to an increase on the level of business segment disclosure.   
 
We also include in the change model, control variables for change on segment reporting due to the 
variance on competitive harm proxies and not necessarily related to IFRS 8 enforcement power. The 
explanation of all control variables are discussed on the model design section. 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1. Sample and Data 
In line with our research proposal, we aim to analyze competitive harm effect on segment reporting 
with IFRS 8 adoption and in non-financial EU listed firms. In order to obtain a substantial larger 
multi-national sample, we used segment information identified on Worldscope database and from 
which we extract data from listed firms of 13 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. On the other 
hand, since we are analyzing the effect of IFRS 8, we selected data representing the pre and post 
periods of its adoption. For the last period of IAS 14R adoption we opted for segment reporting 
presented in 2007, instead of 2008, with the objective of eliminating the effect of early adopters or 
previous adjustments, which could bias the real effect of the new standard. Previous literature, such as 
Prather-Kinsey and Meek (2004) also used the penultimate year of the replaced standard in order to 
avoid segment reporting previously aligned with future standard requirements. Additionally, since our 
segment disclosure data is not directly obtained from content analysis to firms annual financial reports, 
the identification of earlier adopters would be trickier and therefore the use of 2007 is preferable to 
2008. Nichols et al. (2012) analyzed IFRS 8 implementation through the comparison with the last year 
of IAS 14R, i.e. with 2008 data. However, early adopters of IFRS 8 were identified through the notes 
to the annual reports. Finally, we extracted the same data for the 2009, which represents the first year 
of IFRS 8.  
 
Worldscope database provide information for up to ten reportable products/services (business) 
segments. For each segment, we may obtain information on five key financial items: sales, operating 
income, assets, capital expenditures and depreciations. Whenever, information is not available for a 
specific item Worldscope identifies it as “NA” (not available). Despite limited to five items by each 
COMPETITIVE HARM AND BUSINESS SEGMENT REPORTING UNDER IFRS 8  
 
 
19 
 
reportable segment, Worldscope segment data provides important evidence of information quantity on 
the disclosure of major items, and since our main objective is to estimate competitive harm, it has the 
advantage of allowing testing this issue on a vast number of firms and countries. Worldscope database 
is also important to directly or indirectly (computed data) measure our independent variables.  
 
Data extracted from Worldscope database gave us a total of 4.330 listed firms in 2007 and 3.975 listed 
firms in 2009. The process for sample selection was performed country by country. First, we started 
by removing all firms where the “fiscal year end” was not coincident with 31st of December, assuring 
that all firms were subject to the same segment requirements. Then, we removed all firms that did not 
apply IAS/IFRS and therefore are not subject to mandatory adoption of IAS 14R or IFRS 8. On other 
hand, since in EU, IAS/IFRS are only mandatory for consolidated reports, we removed all listed firms 
that published individual accounts (non-consolidated reports). In addition, we excluded all firms that 
were not listed in both years and for whom, an evolution analysis on the level of reported segment 
information would be impossible to perform. Finally, we decide to concentrate our analysis on non-
financial entities. As a consequence, we ended with a total of 1997 non-financial listed firms. 
    
Table 1 – Sample selection process 
Identification Process 
2007 
(IAS 14R) 
2009 
(IFRS 8) 
Listed Firms on Worldscope (13 EU Countries) 4330 3975 
Exclusions 2333 1978 
   1 - Fiscal Year End Different than December 533 478 
   2 - Non-IFRS firms 958 834 
   3 - Individual Accounts 101 72 
   4 - Listed in Only One Year 319 172 
   5 – Financial Entities 422 422 
Final Sample 1997 1997 
% (Final Sample / Total Listed Firms) 46,1% 50,2% 
 
A brief comparison of our sample size to samples used in similar studies analyzing the adoption of 
new segment reporting standards or the proprietary costs influence on the level of such disclosure is 
presented in appendix A. As we can observe, the largest samples were used on proprietary costs 
stream of research for US listed firms. On the same stream and under IAS/IFRS segment reporting 
standards, Nichols and Street (2007) used the biggest sample, comprising 160 listed firms. Our final 
sample of 1997 non-financial listed firms is more than twelve times their size. On the other hand, it is 
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almost six times larger than the sample used by Nichols et al. (2012) for analyzing the introduction of 
IFRS 8 on European countries. 
 
3.2. Measuring Dependent Variables  
For measuring our dependent variables we had to compute Worldscope data to determine the levels of 
business segment disclosure score and the different categories of change.  
 
Measurement of the Level of Business Segment Disclosure 
We estimate our model to three measures of segment reporting score. First score is based in the 
number of reportable segments and the second score is represented by a binary response based on 
confronting single-segment firms with multi-segment firms. Finally, the third score is measured by the 
number of disclosed key items per segment as used by Leuz (2004). These different levels of business 
segment disclosure are calculated for both periods of analysis. As mentioned, Worldscope database 
provides up to ten business segments. For counting the number of reportable segments, we decided to 
eliminate all non-real segments, such as segment observations labelled as “others”, “unallocated”, 
“eliminations” “reconciliations”, “intra-group”, “adjustments” or other similar descriptions. After 
determining the ordered number of reportable business segments, we computed a disclosure score 
classifying firms as disclosures (multi-segment) or non-disclosures (single-segment). Firms that did 
not show any segment information were considered as single-segment firms. Also, we labeled as 
single-segment firms, those who presented data for only one segment. We identify those firms as 
“pseudo disclosures”. In most of these cases segment data is coincident with consolidated data6. In 
fact, disaggregation implies that consolidated information is separately presented for different 
operations (business or geographical segments). Thus, in practice when a firm discloses one segment 
coincident with consolidate values, there is not a real disaggregation in financial information of firm 
activities. Due to this reason, for now on, in all our tests these “pseudo-disclosures” are considered as 
single-segment firms. Finally, our third segment disclosure score resulted from counting the items 
disclosed per segment, which in accordance with Worldscope database could range from zero to five 
items. As we previously justified, in the counting process we considered the “pseudo-disclosures” 
(firms with only one segment) as non-disclosures of key items per segment. 
 
Categories of Change on Business Segment Disclosure 
After the introduction of IFRS 8, we measure change on segment reporting confronting firms’ levels 
of business segment disclosure exhibited in 2009 with those showed in 2007 under IAS 14R. The 
                                                             
6 As an example, in 2007, BDI-Bioenergy Intl. presented only one business segment “Biodiesel” showing the 
value of all five key items for such segment. However, the value of those items was equal to consolidated data. 
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differences on the number of reported segments and on the number of key items, analyzed through 
descriptive statistics, would allow us to identify three categories of change for our multinomial 
regression model: 
 Increase Category, which is the firms’ category representing positive change for the number 
of business reportable segments or for the number of key items. 
 Decrease Category, which is the firms’ category representing negative change for the number 
of business reportable segments or for the number of key items. 
 No Change Category, which is the category representing firms that did not change their level 
of business reportable segments or disclosed key items. 
Despite analyzing how firms behaved on changing their level of business reportable segments, the 
analysis for change on the level of key items is especially interesting as it was a sensitive potential 
effect of IFRS 8. As discussed earlier, firms may disaggregate their operations through the 
presentation of several business segments, but avoid exposure by withholding the disclosure of 
important items. With the new segment requirements, is not clear the effect of the standard in the 
disclosure of key items. If overall improvements in segment reporting are expected, the disclosure of 
items per segment may be reduced, since only a measure of profit or loss and the value of segment 
assets are, in 2009, directly mandatory with IFRS 8. Other requirements are only mandatory if 
regularly reported to CODM, which rule was extended to the disclosure of total assets for annual 
financial statements in 2010. Previous literature reported mixed results for change on items disclosed 
per segment, with some studies documenting a partial decline (IASB, 2013a).  
 
3.3. Regression Models Design 
 
The “Competitive Harm Model” (Ordinal and Logistic Regression) 
In line with our research questions, the competitive harm model is estimated for the pre and post 
period of IFRS 8 adoption. Due to the different measures for the business segment disclosure score, 
the estimation is performed through different regression models7. We use a logistic regression model 
for the binary (dummy) dependent variable representing the distinction of multi-segment firms from 
single-segment firms. As for the number of reportable segments and number of key items, they 
represent ordered outcomes and therefore an ordinal regression model should be applied (Long, 1997). 
The regression model for competitive harm influence on business segment disclosure is designed as 
follows:  
 
                                                             
7 “Once the level of the dependent variable is determined, it is important to match the model used to the level of 
measurement. If the chosen models assume the wrong level of measurement, the estimator could be biased, 
inefficient, or simply inappropriate” (Long, 1997:3). 
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BSEG_NUMi (or BMULTISEGi, or ITEMS_BSi) = αi + β0ABN_PROFITi + β1HERFi + 
β2LAB_POWi + β3ENT_BARi + β4SIZEi + β5LEVi + β6FIRM_PROFITi + β7LIST_INTi + 
β8IND_FIRMi + εi 
Where: 
BSEG_NUMi, is an ordinal variable representing the number of reportable business segments disclosed by 
firm i and available on Worldscope database.  
BMULTISEGi, is a dummy variable that assume 1 if firm i reported two or more business segments or 0 if it 
represents a single-segment firm. 
ITEMS_BSi, is an ordinal variable representing the number of key items per segment, disclosed by firm i and 
available on Worldscope database. 
ABN_PROFITi, represents abnormal profitability, which consists in the difference between firm i ROA and 
the average of all firms’ ROA operating in the same industry group. Return on assets (ROA) is measured by 
the ratio of operating income to total assets. 
HERFi, represents the Herfindahl index as a measure for industry concentration (or competition) for the 
industry group where firm i operates.   
LAB_POWi, represents labor power, which proxy for the influence of labor on firm i financial reporting 
decisions.  
ENT_BARi, represents “entry barriers” to firm i operations and is measured by capital intensity.  
SIZEi, represents firm i size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. 
LEVi, represents financial leverage of firm i measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
FIRM_PROFITi, represents firm i profitability independently of the industry context and is measured by 
firm ROA. 
LIST_INTi, represents listing status of firm i and is measured by a dummy variable, which assumes the value 
1 if firm i is listed internationally (outside its country of domicile) and 0 otherwise. 
IND_FIRMi, is a binary variable, which assumes the value 1 if firm i is the only firm in a given industry and 
therefore likely associated with monopoly. It would assume 0 otherwise. 
 
The most common measure for ABN_PROFIT is based in the ratio of return on assets (ROA), which 
should give us a perspective of performance compared to total investment. ROA is the preferential 
basis for achieving abnormal profitability when measured at a firm-level (Leuz, 2004; Nichols and 
Street, 2007; Katselas et al., 2011). ABN_PROFIT represents the difference between firm ROA and 
the average of all firms’ ROA that are operating in the same industry group (competitors)8. The 
Herfindahl index (HERF) consists on squaring the market share of all firms operating in a given 
industry, as a measure for industry concentration. Using the Herfindahl index, the weight of larger 
firms increases proportionally to the weight of smaller firms. Thus, higher HERF rates represent a 
more concentrated and less competitive industry, where smaller firms may withhold segment 
disclosure due to the existence of a powerful incumbent firm. This is especially important for our 
study, since we use a large sample including smaller listed firms. Both competitive harm proxies are 
based in industry measures. For this purpose we followed the industry group classification provided in 
Worldscope database and at a two-digit level of desegregation. Using an industry code with four-digit 
would result in a more desegregated industry analysis and a better measure for direct competition. 
However, in samples with different countries, a higher disaggregation level could result in many 
                                                             
8 Industry ROA was determined by calculating the mean of all firms’ ROA acting in the same industry code 
within each country, as applied by Nichols and Street (2007). 
(1) 
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industry codes with only one firm, which is an inherent problem for competition comparison9. Even on 
US samples, important studies like Berger and Hann (2007) used an industry concentration ratio based 
on industry codes at a two-digit level. Despite presenting the main results at this level of 
disaggregation, we equally estimate the model in our robustness tests for a three-digit level of industry 
aggregation. Nevertheless and independently of the used industry level, we may find several industries 
with only one firm operating, which could likely be representative of a monopolistic competition. In 
these cases, it is not clear that a firm faces a pressure from potential competitive harm, when 
disclosing proprietary information. The argument of withholding business segment financial data from 
new competitors or incumbent firms loses some validity if competitors are inexistent. Thus for HERF 
at its maximum, the negative association is not so expected. To control this potential inverse effect of 
HERF, we introduced a binary variable IND_FIRM, where 1 identifies a potential monopolistic 
industry and a positive relationship is expected. Finally, for measuring our third hypothesis 
represented by labor power (LAB_POW), we follow the same ratio used by Bens et al. (2011) that 
consists in the division of firms’ total labor costs by firms’ total revenue. 
 
Along with IND_FIRM, we included in the model additional five control variables. ENT BAR 
representing firms with higher entry barriers to their activities that should be less exposed from 
potential entrants. Thus, when entry barriers are higher, firms have likely less motivation to withhold 
segment data and positive association to disclosure should be expected. ENT_BAR is measured by 
capital intensity, which is given by the weight of firms’ net property, plant and equipment on firms’ 
total assets, as described by Leuz (2004). SIZE is a common factor used as control variable to explain 
the level of segment disclosure in the scope of segment reporting research (Herrmann and Thomas, 
1996; Prencipe, 2004; Prather-Kinsey, 2004; Nichols and Street, 2007; Pisano and Landriani, 2012). In 
general, larger firms have more resources, are less exposed to competitive disadvantages and face 
more agency costs due to information asymmetry, which are all incentives to disclose segment data. 
We measure SIZE through the natural logarithm of total assets and expect a positive association to the 
level of business segment disclosure. Leverage (LEV) is a common variable tested as a proxy for 
discretionary disclosure in the scope of segment reporting and especially on non-US based studies 
(Leuz, 2004; Prencipe, 2004; Katselas et al., 2011). Literature, in general, expects a positive relation 
between the rate of financial leverage and the extent of financial disclosures. For Prencipe (2004) 
providing more information would reduce agency costs, when financial leverage rate is high. In the 
opposite direction, some literature also refer that debt indicator can be used for monitoring managers’ 
performance in accordance with shareholders’ interests, what could lead to lower disclosure (Hope, 
                                                             
9 The problem of identifying differences in industry concentration, when there are many industry groups with 
few firms, would have been accentuated if we used the four-firm concentration ratio as an alternative to 
Herfindahl index. 
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2003). Despite, some mixed results on previous literature we hypothesize a positive sign on the 
association of LEV and the level of business segment disclosure. Due to direct availability in 
Worldscope database, we measure the leverage ratio by firms’ total debt (short-term and long-term 
debt) to firms’ total assets. We also add firm own profitability (FIRM_PROFIT) and expect that 
without the industry context and thereby combined with ABN_PROFIT, it would reveal agency costs 
motivation for higher disclosure, when firms may want to positively expose to the market, or for lower 
disclosure, when managers may want to avoid exposure of poor performance (Verrecchia, 1983; 
Berger and Hann, 2007). Thereby, we control for agency costs motives on influencing segment 
disclosure in a contrary way of abnormal profitability. Firm’s profitability is measured by firms’ ROA. 
Finally, we control for higher segment disclosure due to the fact that the firm is listed outside its 
country of domicile. Previous literature showed that firms listed internationally are associated with 
higher levels of compliance with segment reporting standards (Hermann and Thomas, 1996; Hope, 
2003; Prather-Kinsey and Meek, 2004). Hope (2003) pointed two reasons for this expected relation. 
First, foreign markets may induce in extra disclosure requirements and secondly, firms may increase 
their disclosure in order to obtain funds at a lower cost. Researching for lobbying position on ED 8, 
Katselas et al. (2011) documented that firms listed internationally supported IFRS 8, which the authors 
relate to the fact that those firms already practice higher segment disclosure and most of them were 
listed in US markets. LIST_INT is measured by a dummy variable, that assumes 1 if the firm is listed 
outside its country of domicile and 0 otherwise. A positive association is expected for LIST_INT. 
Measurement and the expected sign of each independent variable is resumed in appendix B.  
 
The “Change Model” (Multinomial Regression) 
For estimating how firms previously associated to lower segment disclosure reacted to IFRS 8, the 
“change model” relates the three categories of change with the competitive harm proxies measured in 
the period of IAS 14R. We assume that under the old standard these factors are still influencing 
negatively firms’ segment disclosures. Furthermore, defining change in categories result in a nominal 
dependent variable with three non-ordered categories and the application of multinomial regression 
analysis10. When using a multinomial logistic regression, we ignore the outcomes order and the 
analysis is centered in the logit comparison between all categories. On our multinomial model we use 
the “no change” category as reference. Thereby, the results of the change model should highlight the 
association of the independent variables to “increase or decrease firms” in comparison to those that did 
not change. The multinomial regression model is estimated for change in business reportable segments 
                                                             
10 The nominal dependent variables assume that we are dealing with categories that cannot be ordered. However, 
the multinomial logit regression model is often used as alternative to the ordinal model, when researchers try to 
avoid the proportional odds assumption (Long, 1997). 
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(BSEG_CHANGE) and separately for change in business key items (ITEMS_CHANGE). The 
multinomial change model is designed in following equation:   
 
BSEG_CHANGEi (or ITEMS_CHANGEi) = αi + β0ABN_PROFIT_07i + 
β1ABN_POFIT_GRi + β2HERF_07i + β3HERF_GRi + β4LAB_POW_07i + 
β5LAB_POW_GRi + β6SIZE_GRi + εi 
Where: 
BSEG_CHANGEi, represents firm i category of change on segment reporting based on the number of 
business reportable segments. Business segment change would assume 1 if firm i increased (BSEG_INC), 2 
if decrease (BSEG_DEC) or 3 if there was no change (reference category) on the level of segment 
disclosure. 
ITEMS_CHANGEi, represents firm i category of change on segment reporting based on the number of 
business key items. Thus, items change would assume 1 if firm i increased (ITEMS_INC), 2 if decrease 
(ITEMS_DEC) or 3 if there was no change (reference category) on the level of segment disclosure. 
ABN_PROFIT_07i, HERF_07i, LAB_POW_07i, represent our competitive harm proxies measured by 2007 
data, i.e., from the period previous to IFRS 8 adoption. 
ABN_PROFIT_GRi, HERF_GRi, LAB_POW_GRi and SIZE_GRi represent firm i growth percentage of 
abnormal profitability, Herfindahl index, labor power and size, from the pre (2007) to the post (2009) period 
of IFRS 8 adoption.  
 
We introduced the growth rates of our competitive harm proxies in order to control firms’ behavior not 
attributed to the enforcement of IFRS 8, in reducing previous lower segment disclosure due to 
proprietary costs motives. In accordance with previous assumptions, we hypothesize that firms facing 
a decline (increase) on abnormal profitability, industry concentration or labor power, should be higher 
(less) encouraged to accomplish with IFRS 8, than to withhold segment disclosures. Thus, since we 
use “no change” category as reference, we expect the evolution on these variables to be negatively 
associated with the “increase” category (BSEG_INC or ITEMS_INC). Higher growth on competitive 
harm proxies should be more related to firms that did not change their level of business segment 
reporting. In contrast, we expect a positive association to firms on the “decrease” category 
(BSEG_DEC or ITEMS_DEC). Additionally, we also control for higher disclosure of reportable 
business segments associated with firms’ entrance in new activities and not related the enforcement 
power of IFRS 8. We use the variance on firms size (SIZE_GR) as a proxy for the potential growth of 
firms’ real business diversification. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
4.1. Changes on Business Segment Reporting with IFRS 8 Adoption 
Primary evidence on business segment reporting, provided by Worldscope database, is presented in 
table 2. It represents the weight of single-segment firms (non-disclosures and “pseudo-disclosures”) 
and multi-segment firms on business segment disclosure. In a total of 1997 analyzed firms, more than 
(2) 
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a quarter exhibit zero or only one segment (29,3% in  2007 and 27,5% in 2009). The weight of single-
segment firms, on our sample, is considerably higher than detected by Nichols et al. (2012). This 
difference results, mainly, from the fact that our sample is not based only on the largest listed firms. 
Our results show that, with IFRS 8, the number of single-segment firms decreased in a total of 36 
firms (6,1% of all single-segment firms under IAS 14R).  
 
 
 
Table 2 – Business single-segment firms versus multi-segment firms 
Business Segment 
Disclosures 
Number of 
Segments 
IAS 14R 
(2007) % 
IFRS 8 
(2009) % Change 
Single-Segment: 0-1 586 29,3% 550 27,5% -36 
  - Non-Disclosures 0 144 7,2% 108 5,4% -36 
  - Pseudo-Disclosures 1 442 22,1% 442 22,1% 0 
Multi-Segment > 1 1411 70,7% 1447 72,5% 36 
 Total of Firms 1997 100,0% 1997 100,0% - 
 
In table 3 we resume the number of business reportable segments and the number of business key 
items disclosed by our sample firms. Statistical relevance of changes in the average of segment 
disclosures was estimated and included in the table. The average number of reportable segments and 
key items is exhibited taking all sample firms into account or considering only the multi-segment 
firms.  
 
Table 3 – Change on segmentation typology and on the number of segments 
Business Segment 
Reporting 
IAS 14R (2007) IFRS 8 (2009) Statistics 
Firms No. Average Firms No. Average t-test a p-value 
Reportable Segments       
 
   Multi-Segment 1411 4318 3,06 1447 4522 3,13 1,618 0.106 
   Average Total Firms 1997 4318 2,16 1997 4522 2,26 3,405 0.001 
Key Items       
 
   Multi-Segment 1411 4857 3,44 1447 4949 3,42 -3.841 0.000 
   Average Total Firms 1997 4857 2,43 1997 4949 2,48 1,421 0.155 
a Coefficients of mean comparison based on paired-samples t-test, when firms are the same on both years. Mean 
comparison for sub-samples with different number of firms was estimated through independent-samples t-test. 
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Table 3, in line with table 2, reports that 70,7% (1.411 firms) were business multi-segment firms in 
2007, which percentage increased to 72,5% (1.447 firms) in 2009. Considering only the multi-segment 
firms, the average of business reportable segments was 3,13 under IFRS 8 (or 2,26, including single-
segment firms counted as zero segments). We find a general growth in LOB disclosure, which is 
statistically significant at 1% level, when we use the full sample. This result, combined with the 
decrease of single-segment firms, confirms the expected positive effect of IFRS 8 in increasing 
potential relevant information to investors and other users about firms’ activities.  
 
A deeper characterization of firms business segment disclosure, reveal that the majority of multi-
segment firms, on both standards, disclosed two or three business segments. For example, under IFRS 
8 the number of firms disclosing two to three segments was 1030 (551 firms with two segments and 
479 firms with three segments), which represents 71,2% of all multi-segment firms (or 51,6% of all 
firms). The number of firms declines in representativeness for observations in the highest category of 
reported segments. In fact, firms disclosing five or more business segments represent less than 10% of 
the sample. This evidence is reinforced if we recall the average of 3,06 reportable business segments 
under IAS 14R or 3,13 with IFRS 8 (average considering only multi-segment firms).  
 
The majority of firms did not change their number of segments, which percentage represents 66,4% 
(1327 firms) of all sample. Of those, 442 firms (22,1%) remained as single-segment firms. The global 
increase in the number of reportable business segments represents a net positive change of 80 firms, 
which was a result of 380 firms improving their disclosure, while 290 firms moved in the opposite 
way. This positive change included a net increase of 36 previously single-segment firms. The majority 
of firms increased or decreased one to two segments, which is resulted in an average change of 2,0 
segments on “increased firms” (380 firms) and -1,9 segments on “decrease firms” (290 firms). For 
example, the highest category of change occurred in firms that went from two to three segments (82 
firms), followed by firms that upgraded their level of disclosure from non-disclosures to two segments 
(78 firms) and firms that declined from three to two segments (71 firms).  
 
As for the number of key items per business segment, the results show that the higher number of 
multi-segment firms resulted in an increase on the global number of key items (table 3). However, 
taking the sample as a whole, this improvement is not statistically significant (t=1,421 and p-
value=0.155). In fact, considering only the multi-segment firms, we find a significant decline on the 
average number of key items (t=-3,841 and p-value=0.000). This partial analysis to multi-segment 
firms confirms that, in total, they add up to a larger number of items, but in average, they are 
disclosing a lower number of items per segment under IFRS 8 adoption. In a more detailed analysis, 
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we observe that 1311 (65,6%) firms that did not change, 344 (17,2%) firms that increased disclosure 
and 342 (17,1%) firms moving in the contrary way. The weight of both categories of change is almost 
the same, which is indicative of the mixed effect that IFRS 8 had in this partial analysis of business 
segment disclosure. This seems to suggest that a significant part of the sample stepped back on their 
level of key items disclosure and therefore relevant segment information could have been omitted, 
from firms’ annual financial statements under IFRS 8 adoption. The disclosure score of five key items 
is the most representative for multi-segment firms. However, the number went from 614 under IAS 
14R to 576 with IFRS 8. It represents a net negative change of 38 firms (167 “decrease firms” less 129 
“increase firms”). Along with the declining of firms that disclosed five items, the most accentuated 
positive change occurred in the non-disclosure category (single-segment firms).  
 
In comparison to other studies on IFRS 8 adoption, our results on items disclosure are based in a 
greater number of firms, but however limited to five key items. Those studies analyzed change item by 
item, and as IASB resumed, the key items “capital expenditure” and “liabilities” were those that faced 
a higher decline (IASB, 2013a). Our analysis to segment reporting under IAS 14 and IFRS 8 revealed 
that not all firms disclosed the five key items. Although the differences, results are in line with Nichols 
et al. (2012), which documented also a general growth on the number of reportable segments. 
However, the majority of firms did not change their levels of business segment disclosure and a higher 
number of single-segment firms still prevailed. The post-implementation review of IFRS 8 (IASB, 
2013a) related this to the fact that firms adopted, under IAS 14R, a structure of reporting already based 
on internal report for decision making.  
 
If with IFRS 8 there is a higher number of segment information due to the improvement in the number 
of multi-segment firms, independent sample t-tests confirmed that these firms are now, in average, 
disclosing less key items per segment. Therefore, evidence is not clear on the effect of IFRS 8. In the 
next section we apply the competitive harm model to the level of segment disclosure, trying to capture 
if proprietary costs proxies are still suggesting a negative relation with these disclosures. Additionally, 
we estimate the change model in order to check if this global change, from IFRS 8 adoption, had any 
effect on reducing the previously documented influence of proprietary costs motives to withhold 
segment information. 
 
4.2. Competitive Harm and the Level of Business Segment Disclosures Previous to IFRS 8 
Adoption 
Competitive harm model, applied under IAS 14R, should evidence if proprietary costs motivation still 
persists to constrain the level of segment reporting in the period previous to IFRS 8. Estimation of the 
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model is detailed on table 4, for three different measures of segment disclosure score. In the first 
column the disclosure score BSEG_NUM is based in the ordered number of reported business 
segments (ordinal regression). Second column describe the estimation of a logistic model using a 
binary variable BMULTISEG, separating multi-segment firms from single-segment firms. In this 
analysis, disclosure firms are all classified in the same category, independently of their number of 
business segments, which reduces the potential error from the effect of higher disclosure due to real 
firm diversification. As for third and fourth columns, the competitive harm model is estimated through 
an ordinal regression for the disclosure score based on the number of key items per segment, using the 
full sample or only the multi-segment firms. By performing the additional estimation of the model 
with a sub-sample of multi-segment firms (1374 firms) we exclude the repeated effect of single-
segment firms included on previous estimations, which should improve the analysis for ITEMS_BS.  
 
Overall, evidence shows that EU listed firms, subject to potential proprietary costs, due to competitive 
harm, are still related to lower levels of business segment reporting in the last periods of IAS 14R and 
at the edge of IFRS 8 adoption. The results for BSEG_NUM and BMULTISEG are similar and, in 
both versions of the model, we found a negative relationship for ABN_PROFIT and HERF at a 
significance level of 1%. The lower differences between the two estimations seem to suggest that 
firms performing better than their competitors and acting in more concentrated industries are 
essentially related to decision of presenting themselves as single-segment firms11. Thus, if these firms 
provided less segment disclosures, they were likely withholding relevant information from competitors 
and from the market. Like in prior literature (e.g. Harris, 1998; Botosan and Harris, 2005), firms 
operating in more concentrated industries are related to lower segment disclosure, as they fear 
competitive harm from strong incumbent firms or new competitors, which could lead to the potential 
loss of market share and to profitability reduction. 
 
As discussed earlier, firms may consider their operations as reportable segments, but limited its 
comprehension if key items are omitted. Results from the ordinal regression model, using the full 
sample, show that lower ITEMS_BS are associated with firms’ performing superior to their industry 
and to firms that are operating in higher concentrated industries. ABN_PROFIT is negatively and 
statistical significant for a level of significance of 1%. Leuz (2004) paper achieved also a statistical 
and negative relationship between profitability (to industry) and the level of key items disclosed by 
German listed firms. Removing the influence of single-segment firms in the model, i.e. using only 
multi-segment firms, the association of ABN_PROFIT with the practice of lower disclosure is 
                                                             
11 In fact, if we estimate the ordinal regression model for BSEG_NUM using only multi-segment firms (ordered 
categories with at least two reportable business segments), we failed to identify statistical associations on all 
competitive harm proxies. 
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reinforced. The negative and significant relationship of ABN_PROFIT, within the same level of 
significance, seems to induce that although providing reportable business segments, managers 
potentially hide important segment indicators in order to protect access to performance measures of 
their activities. As for HERF, the estimated coefficient, for the full sample, shows that higher industry 
concentration rates are related to lower ITEMS_BS within a 5% significance level. However, if we 
take only multi-segment firms into account the relationship loses statistical significance. Thereby, for 
firms desegregating operations through reportable business segments, there is no statistical evidence 
that they are withholding important line of items per segment. Combined results seem to suggest that 
firms operating in more concentrated industries are essentially related to the primary decision of non-
disclosing segment information, i.e. to likely show themselves as single-segment firms. 
 
Table 4 – Competitive harm and the level of business segment disclosure previous to IFRS 8 adoption 
VARIABLES BSEG_NUM1 
(ordered) 
BMULTISEG 
(binary) 
ITEMS_BS2 
(ordered) 
ITEMS_BS3 
(ordered) 
ABN_PROFIT_2D -3.603 *** -4,868 *** -4,573 *** -3.381 *** 
HERF_2D -0.877 *** -1.063 *** -0.442 ** 0.140 
LAB_POW -0.318 ** -0.319 * -0.646 *** -0.783 *** 
ENT_BAR -0.274 -0.245 0.206 0.384 
SIZE 0.690 *** 0.644 *** 0.847 *** 0.716 *** 
LEV 0.625 *** 0.427 -0.300 -0.551 * 
FIRM_PROFIT 2.991 *** 4.321 *** 4,831 *** 4.122 *** 
LIST_INT -0.107 0.012 0.010 0.001 
IND_FIRM_2D 0.724 *** 0.890 ** 0.588 * 0.139 
Constant4 - -2.205 *** - - 
Number of Firms5 1860 1860 1860 1374 
LR test 283,29 *** 173,21 *** 369,86 *** 228,00 *** 
Cox & Snell pseudo R2 0.141 0.089 0.180 0.153 
*, **, ***, represents, respectively, statistically significant at 10% (p < 0.10), 5% (p < 0.05) and 1% (p < 0.01). 
1 Ordinal regression with ordered categories from zero to five business segments, which meets the assumption of 
proportional odds (parallel lines test). Last category includes observations with five or more business segment 
number. 
2 Ordinal regression with three ordered categories of key items disclosure, which meets the assumption of 
proportional odds. Lower category includes observations of zero, one or two items. Second category for 
observations of three or four items and a higher category for full key items disclosure.  
3 Previous ordinal regression using a sub-sample of multi-segment firms. 
4 On ordinal regression we obtain constant values for the different categories, which are all significant at a 1% 
level, but not showed individually. 
5 The regression tests are based on a sample of 1860 non-financial firms, as a result of removing 137 firms from 
the initial sample (1997 firms) due to missing data in at least one independent variable. 
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The estimated coefficients for labor influence in segment disclosure (LAB_POW) confirm our third 
hypotheses. Yet, the negative association with BSEG_NUM and BMULTISEG is statistically 
significant, respectively, within a 5% and 10% level of significance. Despite confirming the initial 
predictions, we expected this association to be even stronger for key items disclosure, since employees 
could be more sensitive to indicators of performance, than to the number of business the firms 
operates. These predictions are confirmed through the ordinal regression model applied to ITEMS_BS, 
where we found a negative significant relationship at 1%, even when we estimated the model only for 
multi-segment firms. Therefore, the results confirm our hypothesis for the influence of labor power on 
segment disclosures, which could induce that managers concealed information in order to avoid the 
loss of bargain power with employees or union labors. These results represent the first evidence that, 
under IAS 14R, the weight of labor seems to influence managers decisions to conceal segment data.  
 
As for our control variables, we could not find any evidence on the effect of entry barriers 
(ENT_BAR) in all tested disclosure scores, despite the positive relationship found with ITEMS_BS. 
Our prediction that firms with higher entry barriers (measured by capital intensity) were less exposed 
to competitive harm and therefore more predisposed to disclose segment information, was not 
confirmed. Predictions for SIZE and FIRM_PROFIT are confirmed as we found, in all disclosure 
scores, a positive relationship to the disclosure of segment information at 1% level of significance. 
Evidence on firms’ size is aligned with previous literature, which states that larger firms are more 
exposed to the market and have lower costs of producing information. Larger firms have higher 
incentives to disclose segment information reducing agency costs. They are also better prepared for 
avoiding competition harm and, due to their diversity and complexity, when compared to smaller firms 
they have higher ability to aggregated activities, without presenting lower levels of disclosure. The 
positive association of firm own profitability is especially interesting, because we found that 
controlling FIRM_PROFIT together with ABN_PROFIT, i.e. with the effect of performance over 
industry, firms could likely have an incentive to disclose segment information in order to positive 
influence the market and distinguish themselves from other firms. On other hand, we expected also 
this variable to capture non-disclosure due to extreme negative profitability. When agency costs 
motivation overlaps proprietary costs motivation, firms may want to withhold information about poor 
performance.  
 
The results for LEV are mixed, and if a positive and strong relationship is found for the number of 
business segments (BSEG_NUM), results on key items (ITEMS_BS) disclosed by multi-segment 
firms show a contrary association (at a 10% level of significance). Estimated coefficients of LEV did 
not reveal a statistical association to BMULTISEG and ITEMS_BS when using the full sample. The 
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problem with leverage results on ITEMS_BS could be associated with country differences related to 
the manner, how firms culturally manage their relation with financers, as discussed on leverage 
hypothesis. For example, Leuz (2004) found a negative relation to key items disclosure by German 
firms, but only significant in one of the used dependent variables. Instead, Prencipe (2004) found a 
positive association for Italian listed firms. We also find that firms operating in a potential 
monopolistic environment (IND_FIRM) are positively related to higher segment disclosure, within a 
level of significance of 1% for BSEG_NUM, 5% for MULTISEG and 10% for ITEMS_BS (with full 
sample). As predicted, the positive and significant relationship seems to suggest that industry 
concentration at its maximum (HERF = 100%) have an inverse relationship to the level of business 
segment disclosure, than higher concentration ratios on industries with two or more competitors. Thus, 
evidence suggests that without competitors, firms lose their motivation to withhold segment 
information. This is an important result, since it represents a new variable tested in this context. 
Finally and in contrast with some previous findings (Leuz, 2004; Katselas et al., 2011), we did not find 
any statistical evidence on the relationship between LIST_INT and the level of segment disclosures. 
 
In conclusion, we confirm that, in the last period of IAS 14R adoption, firms are likely withholding 
segment data in order to avoid competition costs, since in line with proprietary costs theory, 
ABN_PROFIT, HERF and LAB_POW revealed to be negatively and statistically associated with the 
different levels of segment disclosure. By updating this issue on recent segment disclosure practices 
and by step up the analysis (new proprietary costs proxies) in the context of EU listed firms, these 
results are an initial, but important contribution to literature. However, as we previously documented, 
with IFRS 8 adoption there was a general increase on segment reporting. Thus, if the new segment 
information represents an increase in segment disclosure transparency, we expect the estimation of our 
model, under IFRS 8, to evidence a loss of significance on the negative relation between the 
competitive harm proxies and the different levels of business segment disclosure. We may also expect 
that firms with an increase in their segment information should be those associated with abnormal 
profitability, less competitive industries (higher concentrated) and higher labor weight in the previous 
period to IFRS 8 adoption. In the next section we deal with competitive harm influence under IFRS 8 
and the potential effect of the new standard on reducing such influence on firms previously associated 
to non-disclosure of segment data.   
 
4.3. IFRS 8 Effect on Competitive Harm Influence in Segment Reporting 
 
Competitive Harm and Segment Reporting under IFRS 8 
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To identify IFRS 8 effect on previous association of competitive harm and segment reporting, we start 
to apply the same regression models, but in the context of the new standard. In table 5 we resume the 
estimation of competitive harm model for each of the disclosure scores defined before. Overall, 
evidence seems similar to those obtained when the model was applied for the last period of IAS 14R, 
which may suggest that the adoption of IFRS 8 was unable to reduce the level of significance in the 
association of competitive harm to lower disclosure. Results show that firms over performing their 
industry (ABN_PROFIT) and operating in less competitive industries (HERF) maintain their negative 
relationship to the ordered number of reported segments (BSEG_NUM) and to firms’ identification as 
multi-segment (BMULTISEG). On the other hand, the negative association of LAB_POW is also 
maintained, but reinforced for a 1% level of significance. The evidence for our three hypotheses seems 
consistent with the low or null effect of IFRS 8 on decreasing the relationship between competitive 
harm and lower disclosure, although the documented overall increase on the average number of 
reportable business segments and on the decline of single-segment firms. In fact, if we estimate the 
ordinal regression model, using only multi-segment firms (not tabulated), with IFRS 8 we found a 
negative statistical significant association of ABN_PROFIT and the number of reportable business 
segments, which was not documented under IAS 14R. Thus, despite disaggregating their business 
segment under IFRS 8, firms performing better than its competitors tend to disclose a lower number of 
reportable segments, what seems to highlight the reduce positive effect attributed to the new standard.  
 
Table 5 - Competitive harm and the level of business segment disclosure under IFRS 8  
VARIABLES BSEG_NUM1 
(ordered) 
BMULTISEG 
(binary) 
ITEMS_BS2 
(ordered) 
ITEMS_BS3 
(ordered) 
ABN_PROFIT_2D -2.108 *** -2.130 *** -2.922 *** -2.696 *** 
HERF_2D -1.038 *** -1.624 *** -0.648 *** 0.094  
LAB_POW -0.519 *** -0.682 *** -0.530 *** -0.287 
ENT_BAR -0.088  0.145 0.397 * 0.366 
SIZE 0.680 *** 0.710 *** 0.811 *** 0.666 *** 
LEV -0.013 -0.044  0.003 0.310 
FIRM_PROFIT 1.593 *** 1.526 ** 2.553 *** 2.825 *** 
LIST_INT -0.140 -0.046  -0.038 -0.021 
IND_FIRM_2D 0.687 ** 0.699 * 0.752 ** 0.544  
Constant4 - -1.953 *** - - 
Number of Firms 1891 1891 1891 1420 
LR test 267,08 *** 199,74 *** 342,79 *** 198,92 *** 
Cox & Snell pseudo R2 0.132 0.100 0.166 0.131 
*, **, ***, represents respectively, statistical significant at 10% (p < 0.10), 5% (p < 0.05) and 1% (p < 0.01). 
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1 Ordinal regression with ordered categories from zero to four business segments, which meets the assumption of 
proportional odds (parallel lines test). Last category includes observations with four or more business segment 
number. 
2 Ordinal regression with three ordered categories of key items disclosure, which meets the assumption of 
proportional odds. Lower category includes observations of zero, one or two items. Second category for 
observations of three or four items and a higher category for full key items disclosure.  
3 Previous ordinal regression using a sub-sample of multi-segment firms. 
4 On ordinal regression we obtain constant values for the different categories, which are all significant at a 1% 
level, but not showed individually. 
5 The regression tests are based on a sample of 1891 non-financial firms, as a result of removing 106 firms from 
the initial sample (1997 firms) due to missing data in at least one independent variable. 
 
Equally, for the segment disclosure score based on key items (ITEMS_BS with full sample), the 
negative and significant associations for all competitive harm proxies, persist with IFRS 8. Therefore, 
the new standard does not seem to be associated with firms that were practicing lower disclosure of 
key items per segment, due to concerns of competition costs. After the quantitative analysis, this result 
was likely expected, despite the global increase on the number of key items, once the average number 
per segment declined. Firms’ behavior was mixed and, despite we are not providing a direct analysis 
on the disclosure of each item, some firms may have also taken advantage of IFRS 8 requirements12 
for declining their number of items. As for the model estimates on ITEMS_BS without single-segment 
firms, only ABN_PROFIT revealed to be negative and statically associated, while LAB_POW lost its 
statistical significance.  
 
SIZE and FIRM_PROFIT kept their positive relationship to all segment disclosure scores, while we 
could not find, with IFRS 8, a positive association for LEV. The control variable proxying for entry 
barriers show weak results, but a positive and significant association was found to ITEMS_BS (full 
sample), within a 10% level of significance. In addition, potential monopolistic firms (IND_FIRM) are 
also positively and statistically related to higher disclosures, which allow us to control for the expected 
negative association of higher Herfindahl index to segment disclosure, whenever the firm is not the 
only player in the market (sample). 
 
Globally, these econometric tests revealed that IFRS 8 seems to have been unsuccessful in reducing 
the historical association of competitive harm to lower segment disclosure. Quantitative analysis 
evidenced an increase on segment reporting, but a relevant part of the sample moved also in opposite 
way. Furthermore and as we described earlier, concerns of competition harm providing from the 
disclosure of segment information was still an important issue identified by respondents to IASB post 
implementation review (IASB, 2013b). Investors also responded to the IASB showing some concerns 
on the persistence, under IFRS 8, of managers’ ability to explore segment aggregation rule.  
                                                             
12 As discussed on IFRS 8 requirements, most of line-of-items are only mandatory, if they are disclosed on 
internal segment reporting analyzed by the CODM.     
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Nevertheless, in the next section we look at the different categories of change decomposing the 
potential partial effects of IFRS 8. Furthermore, we also provide alternative estimations for the 
competitive harm model under IFRS 8, which tests the robustness of our analysis.  
 
Competitive Harm and Firms’ Change on Segment Reporting 
The “change model” should provide additional evidence to the partial effects of the new standard 
based in the way firms changed their segment disclosures. More specifically, we estimate a 
multinomial regression model for the influence of competitive harm for the three possible categories 
of change on segment reporting (“increase” category, “decrease” category, “no change” category). The 
model is estimated separately for both levels of business segment disclosure (number of segments and 
number of items) and by using multinomial regression, we may separate the estimation of IFRS 8 
effect on “increase” and “decrease” categories. Since we aim to analyze competitive harm to positive 
and negative change, we selected the “no change” category as reference. 
 
Table 6 – Multinomial regression model for competitive harm and change on the number of business 
segments 
VARIABLES BSEG_INC BSEG_DEC 
ABN_PROFIT_07 -1.155 ** -1.452 *** 
ABN_PROFIT_2D_GR -0.015 0.672 
HERF_07 -0.183 0.110 
HERF_2D_GR -0.049 0.818 
LAB_POW_07 -0.601** -0.403 * 
LAB_POW_GR -0.505 -0.015 
SIZE_GR 0.042 -0.144 
Constant -1.002 *** -1.389 *** 
*, **, ***, represents, respectively, statistical significant at 10% (p < 0.10), 5% (p < 0.05) and 1% (p < 0.01). 
Firms considered in the model in a total of 1866 (131 firms excluded from regression model due to missing 
values). LR test is 30,47 (p-value=0.007). Cox & Snell pseudo R2 is 0.016. Multinomial model with “no change” 
category as reference. BSEG_INC (BSEG_DEC) represents firms that increased (decreased) their number of 
business segments.  
 
Table 6 shows the results of the multinomial estimation model for the number of business segments. 
The second column exhibit the estimated coefficients for “increase firms” (BSEG_INC) compared to 
those firms that did not changed, while the third column shows the estimated coefficients for firms that 
decreased segment reporting (BSEG_DEC). If, as theorized, IFRS 8 would force firms that concealed 
the number of business segment to start disclosing their full operations, we should expect a positive 
association between our competitive harm proxies and the “increase” category (BSEG_INC). 
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However, results from the change model, shown on table 6, induce in the opposite direction. Statistical 
evidence suggests that firms with higher abnormal profitability (ABN_PROFIT_07) and labor power 
(LAB_POW_07), in the period previous to IFRS 8 adoption, are negatively related to the growth of 
business segments number. As for HERF_07 the estimated coefficient is also negative, but statistically 
insignificant. Thus, in general, the results do not confirm the hypotheses and seem to induce that firms 
previously subject to higher competitive harm were those that did not change their number of business 
segments.  
 
Evidence for firms that declined their number of business segments (BSEG_DEC) attenuate the 
potential negative effect of IFRS 8, since ABN_PROFIT_07 and LAB_POW_07 shown a negative 
and significant association to BSEG_DEC. Thereby, firms with previously higher abnormal 
profitability and higher labor power are statistically associated to the “no change” category, instead of 
“decrease” category. Overall, the combined results for BSEG_INC and BSEG_DEC seem to suggest 
that IFRS 8 had a null impact on reducing the association of abnormal profitability, industry 
concentration and labor power with lower disclosure scores based on business operating segments. 
This evidence appears to be in line with the initial results, where we estimated the competitive harm 
model on segment disclosures provided under IFRS 8 adoption. We could not find a significant 
association for the control variables representing growth on the competitive harm variables and on 
firms’ size. Although not statistically significant, firms where business reportable segments decreased 
are positively related to abnormal profitability and industry concentration growth, which likely 
accentuate the negative relationship of those variables under IFRS 8.  
 
Table 7 – Multinomial regression model for competitive harm and change on the number of key items  
VARIABLES ITEMS_INC ITEMS_DEC 
ABN_PROFIT_2D -0.617 -0.534 
ABN_PROFIT_2D_GR 0.082 1.054** 
HERF_2D -0.358 -0.313 
HERF_2D_GR -0.100 -1.004 
LAB_POW -0.584 ** -0.369 
LAB_POW_GR -0.352 -0.075 
SIZE_GR 0.023 -0.084 
Constant -1.034 *** -1.065 *** 
*, **, ***, represents, respectively, statistical significant at 10% (p < 0.10), 5% (p < 0.05) and 1% (p < 0.01). 
Firms considered in the model in a total of 1866 (131 firms excluded from regression model due to missing 
values). LR test is 24,89 (p-value=0.036). Cox & Snell pseudo R2 is 0.013. Multinomial model with “no change” 
category as reference. ITEMS_INC (ITEMS_DEC) represents firms that increased (decreased) their number of 
key items.  
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Table 7 shows the multinomial regression results for business key items change taking also firms that 
did not change as the category of reference. Once again, we achieve evidence contrary to the expected 
positive effect of IFRS 8. The coefficients for ABN_PROFIT_07 exhibit a negative association to 
firms that increased or decreased their level of key items, but however not statistical significant. In 
addition, table 7 exhibits a positive relationship between abnormal profitability growth 
(ABN_PROFIT_GR) and firms that declined their number of key items (ITEMS_DEC), when 
compared to firms that did not change. This result suggests that, in the IFRS 8 period of adoption, 
when abnormal profitability grows firms likely started to withhold important segment data, which 
could be a result of IFRS 8 requirements for line of items (only mandatory when reported to CODM). 
The last statistical evidence suggests that ITEMS_INC (firms with an increase on key items) is 
negatively associated to higher labor power (LAB_POW_07) in the period previous to IFRS 8. The 
negative relationship of all competitive harm proxies to ITEMS_INC highlight the null effect of IFRS 
8 on firms subject to a more severe competitive environment. This suggests that these firms 
maintained their lower levels of items disclosure or likely adopted IFRS 8 with more caution. Other 
control variables for growth on competitive harm proxies and for firms size change (SIZE_GR) exhibit 
results, statistically non-significant.. 
 
General conclusion for all tests, performed on the effect of IFRS 8, suggest that the new standard, had 
no (or an insignificant) effect on reducing lower disclosure practices due to proprietary costs. 
Competitive harm model estimated for 2009 segment data still evidences a negative and statistical 
relationship between our competitive harm proxies (abnormal profitability, industry concentration and 
labor power) and the level of business segment reporting, despite the global increase in segment 
disclosures. Furthermore, the multinomial regression model did not show any relevant and positive 
association between firms that increased segment disclosures and competitive harm proxies from the 
pre-period of IFRS 8 adoption. In contrary, some significant evidence was found for a negative 
association of ABN_PROFIT_07 and LAB_POW_07 to “increase firms” in opposition to those that 
did not changed. 
 
If expectations aligned with IASB were not confirmed, the future maturity on IFRS 8 implementation 
may force these EU listed firms, within a higher competitive harm environment, to increase their 
segment disclosures. Since we analyzed the first year of adoption, firms may acted with precaution, 
waiting for competitors’ reaction to the standard. Thus, in the future, accounting enforcement from 
IASB and other actors, such as auditors, may pressure these EU listed firms to improve their level of 
segment desegregation.        
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Robustness Check and Additional Tests 
In order to turn our analysis more robust, we performed additional econometric tests and alternative 
estimations of the competitive harm model for the levels of segment reporting under IFRS 8: 
- Multinomial regression analysis as an alternative to the previous estimated ordinal regression for key 
items, using the multi-segment sample and, for which the proportional odds assumption failed 
(appendix C); 
- Competitive harm model estimation controlling for the level of industry aggregation (appendix D); 
- Competitive harm model estimation controlling for the generic industry group classification 
(appendix E); 
- Competitive harm model estimation controlling for the relevance of geographic segmentation over 
business segmentation (appendix F); 
- Competitive harm model estimation controlling for the strong correlation of abnormal profitability to 
firm profitability (appendix G). 
 
Despite providing an econometric alternative to ordinal regression validity, the application of a 
multinomial regression, also allows a different view of analysis to the competitive harm model and the 
number of key items disclosed by multi-segment firms (last column of table 5). These firms may 
represent five different categories of disclosure (from 1 to 5 key items). In order to simplify the 
analysis we estimate the model, taking full disclosure as reference (5 key items reported) and therefore 
we expect that lower categories of key items to be positively related to competitive harm proxies. For 
example, given the previous results we expect that abnormal profitability is more related to the 
disclosure of one key item than to the disclosure of all five key items (value of reference in the 
multinomial model). Robustness check provided by the multinomial model, shown on appendix C, 
confirm the previous negative association of ABN_PROFIT to the level of key items, since the 
categories of one and two items are those positively related to ABN_PROFIT in comparison to the 
“five items category”. Tabulated results also identify that, in average, firms with higher 
ABN_PROFIT disclosed one or two items per segment. The estimated coefficient for labor power, in 
the original ordinal regression was not statistically significant. However, with the higher detail 
provided by multinomial regression, we documented that, statistically, firms disclosing one item are 
more related to higher ABN_PROFIT than firms providing full disclosure (five key items).       
 
On our main tests to the competitive harm model, the independent variables were calculated based on 
an industry group level of aggregation of two-digit, as used for example by Berger and Hann (2007). If 
it avoids obtaining many industries with a single firm, we may obtain some industries too broad in 
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their scope of classification. In this sense, a more disaggregated industry level would represent a more 
tide analysis of competition. Thus, in appendix D, we present the estimation of the competitive harm 
model using a classification based on three-digit industry groups, such as use by Nichols and Street 
(2007). The variables ABN_PROFIT, HERF and IND_FIRM were recalculated and introduced into 
the model, replacing those measured at a two-digit level. The results show that the significant negative 
relationship between abnormal profitability (ABN_PROFIT), industry concentration (HERF) and 
labor power (LAB_POW) with the level of business segment disclosure remain practically unchanged. 
In fact, using this level of industry aggregation, we now obtain a negative and statistical relation 
between industry concentration and the disclosure of key items by multi-segment firms. 
 
In addition to previous robustness tests for the level of industry aggregation we restrict the competitive 
harm model removing firms classified in industry groups too generic on their scope. These industry 
groups could contain miscellaneous activities, which mean that firms within this broad classification 
may not be direct competitors. For this purpose, we removed miscellaneous industry groups and 
applied our model to a sample of 1508 firms, whose results are shown in appendix E. Once again, the 
evidence confirms that our competitive harm model is robust to the exclusion of potential diversified 
industry classifications, since the results for our main hypotheses (ABN_PROFIT, HERF and 
LAB_POW) are all confirmed. 
 
Another robustness test was conducted to control for the relevance of geographic segmentation over 
the disclosure of business segments. Since Worldscope database does not inform which typology of 
segmentation corresponds to the operating segments (primary format of report under IFRS 8), some of 
our business disclosures could be less, because operating segments may be based on geographical 
segmentation. In these cases, firms may show extended segment disclosures that are not captured by 
business segment reporting. If this may seem a limitation of our model, we also defend that despite the 
lower business segmentation due to higher geographical disclosures, the results indicating a negative 
association to competitive harm proxies, would evidence that relevant business segment data is being 
omitted from the investors and other interested parties. Furthermore, it is also accepted that firms with 
higher international activities are less exposed to internal industry competition. Thus, we re-estimated 
our model, controlling for potential lower disclosure of business segments due to firms’ segment 
reporting being based on geographical areas. For this purpose, we excluded from our tests, firms that 
showed higher and relevant geographical disclosure. This sample filter is defined by a binary response, 
where we identified if firms’ geographical segmentation was higher and relevant. Identification 
process, started with the comparison between the number of geographical and business key items. If 
operating segments are based on geographic areas, their number of disclosed items should be higher 
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than those present by business segmentation. In addition, for these firms, we analyze the relevance of 
geographical segments, for which, we define as a satisfactory level geographic heterogeneity. With 
this assumption we want to capture “real” geographical segmentation and avoid excluding firms that 
may justify lower business disclosures with non-relevant geographic reporting. Thereby, we consider 
that firms with only two geographical segments do not represent a relevant desegregation. In contrast, 
firms with four or more geographic segments were considered relevant. In cases where the firm 
showed three reportable segments, we checked for heterogeneity, considering relevant whenever a 
firm presented country by country segmentation (e.g. Austria, France, United States) or different 
geographic areas such as continents (e.g. Europe, Africa, Asia). We consider non-relevant, for 
example, when the three segments represented regions of firms’ domicile country or when the 
segments represented home country and two broad regions (e.g. Austria, Europe, Rest of the World). 
 
With the exclusion of firms associated to both, higher geographic key items disclosure and relevant 
geographical areas reported as segments, the robustness of the model was tested using a subsample of 
1675 firms. Appendix F shows the results for all our measures of business segment disclosure and 
where, after controlling for relevant international firms, we find evidence consistent with our main 
results. Firms showing abnormal profitability, acting in less competitive industries (more 
concentrated) and subject to higher labor power continue to evidence a negative and statistically 
relationship to the overall level of business segment disclosure. 
 
Finally we also estimate the competitive harm model controlling for the identified higher value of 
correlation between firm profitability and abnormal profitability (Pearson/Spearman correlation). We 
included firm profitability in the model (without the industry context), in order to control for two 
situations that could introduce noise on abnormal profitability results. First, firms with exceptional 
profitability may have an incentive to higher disclosure, trying to positively influence the market and 
reducing agency costs. Secondly, firms with higher negative profitability may withhold segment 
reporting to mask poor performance and avoid adverse reaction from the market. Thus and although 
the results of our competitive harm model including the two variables were in line with predictions, 
we added these robustness tests removing FIRM_PROFIT from the main model. Results on appendix 
G show that, overall, our model is robust to the removal of firm profitability as control variable. The 
negative relationship of ABN_PROFIT and BSEG_NUM, BMULTISEG and ITEMS_BS (using full 
sample) is still statistically significant, but however for the last two, only for a level of significance of 
5%. However, the results for ITEMS_BS on multi-segments firms, showed the sensitivity of 
ABN_PROFIT to firm profitability, as the relationship revealed to be non-statistical significant. This 
may indicate that once a firm decided to separately disclosure business segments, the decisions to 
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practice lower disclosure through key items in order to protect abnormal profitability, loses relevance. 
In fact, the disclosure of profit/loss measure was in 2009 mandatory for firms presenting operating 
segments based on business desegregation.  
 
4.3. Limitations and Future Research 
Despite the importance of our findings, we identified some limitations that may work as starting point 
for future research. The use of Worldscope database allows us to adopt a substantially larger sample 
and therefore turn our regression model and results more robust, but it also limited in the available 
segment data, especially when we are using a level of disclosure based in the number of segment 
items. The use of all demanded items would increase the differences of disclosure between sample 
firms and improve the relevance of the results. Segment disclosures could be directly collected from 
firms’ financial statements, which however, would difficult the use of a sample with the dimension of 
ours. Another limitation, which is common to most previous studies, comes from the use of only listed 
firms. This situation makes that unlisted firms are not considered as competition. However, since we 
used a larger sample, we included smaller listed firms that are omitted in some previous researches.  
 
Our results are also limited in country by country analysis. Overall, the application of our competitive 
harm model to each EU country showed weak and mixed results (not tabulated). This could be due to 
the fact that the competitive harm model is more related to firms’ characteristics on competition than 
to country analysis. Nichols and Street (2007) evidenced also limited country results. Exploring 
competitive harm on geographical disclosure is yet a challenge for research on segment reporting. If 
literature discusses, essentially, competitive harm due to industry factors, multinational firms may also 
be pressured to avoid the disclosure of financial information from their operations in more sensitive 
countries. The inclusion of non-European firms applying IFRS 8 could also improve the analysis, 
since it would likely increase the differences among firms based on country of origin. Another 
improvement to the model may come from including other control variables that may exercise 
influence on financial segment reporting, especially due to agency costs motivation.  
 
Finally, we tested our competitive harm model using the first year of IFRS 8 adoption. However the 
maturity on its interpretation and adoption, accentuated by the potential enforcement from the IASB, 
Securities Commissions or Auditors, may lead to improvements in segment reporting over time and a 
decline on its negative association to competitive harm. Therefore, an analysis comprehending several 
years of IFRS 8 adoption would highlight the potential effect of the new standard. Equally, the 
analysis to the disclosure of an individual item may provide an additional view on segment reporting 
practices. For example, since segment total assets are, for exercises beginning in 2010, only mandatory 
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if disclosed internally to CODM, the examination of its change would improve evidence of how the 
management approach may use IFRS 8 to influence segment items disclosure. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
The main objective of this paper was to investigate, if competitive harm still persists as a negative 
influence on the levels of firms’ segment reporting and estimate the potential positive effect of IFRS 8. 
Despite addressing this problematic under the scope of a new standard, we aim to contribute to 
literature through our model specifications and sample differences relatively to previous research. We 
use an improved “competitive harm regression model” based in three competitive harm proxies 
(abnormal profitability, industry concentration and labor power), which were not tested together yet on 
the scope of IASB segment reporting standards. We also add a new control variable for industry 
concentration representing the expected contrary effect of potential monopolistic firms. The model 
was estimated with different regression techniques and in line with the different measures for segment 
disclosure score. In addition, we developed a an empirical model for estimating how firms previously 
associated to competitive harm reacted to change on segment reporting with the introduction of IFRS 
8. We applied a multinomial regression model (“change model”) comparing firms that increased and 
firms that declined segment reporting with those that did not change. Furthermore, we use a 
substantial larger sample of 13 EU countries, including a significant portion of small and medium size 
listed firms, which are likely more sensitive to competitive harm. For all these reasons, we believe that 
the relevance and timeliness of our research was justified and we expected our results to be a clearly 
contribution to proprietary costs theory on the practice of discretionary disclosure due to competitive 
harm.  
 
Overall, our results showed that, under IFRS 8, competitive harm is still a factor associated to lower 
levels of segment disclosure and the standard did not have a significant effect in reducing such 
relation. However, and aligned with literature, we identified a significant increase in the number of 
reportable segments, with a general decline in single-segment firms. As for the disclosure of business 
key items, we found that the average disclosure on multi-segment firms decreased significantly. The 
majority of firms did not change segment reporting and a relevant part of the sample moved in fact, in 
the contrary way, which was especially observed on the negative change of disclosed key items. 
Country by country evidence on change, in the average number of reportable business segments and 
reportable key items, revealed mixed results. The non-mandatory requirements (only if reported to 
CODM) for disclosure in line of items may explain this decline of reporting. On the other hand, 
feedback statement on the post-implementation review of IFRS 8 documented that users are still 
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concern with the potential use of segment aggregation criteria by managers seeking to withhold 
segment information.  
    
Applied to the pre and post period of IFRS 8 adoption, the estimated competitive harm model showed 
similar results on both periods. Evidence, documented an overall negative relationship between all 
competitive harm proxies and the level of business segment disclosure. If results for IAS 14R segment 
reporting confirm the persistence of competitive harm influence on lower disclosures, results from 
IFRS 8 reveal that the new standard seemed to have an insignificant effect on this issue. Under both 
standards, firms performing better than its industry mean are likely more motivated to aggregate 
financial segment data of their different activities. Through aggregation of potential segment data 
(number of segments and items per segment), firms are likely avoiding exposure to competitors about 
their sources of abnormal profitability. On other hand, firms acting in less competitive industries 
(higher industry concentration) continue to show a negative relationship to the level of segment 
disclosure. Evidence is statistically significant for the pre and post period of IFRS 8, which may 
suggest that EU firms persist to withhold segment data when the market shows a higher imperfect 
competition. The higher values of Herfindahl index for industry concentration are evidence for the 
existence of a powerful competitor with a higher market share compared to others. In this scenario, 
other firms are likely more reluctant to expose themselves, due to their higher sensibility to 
competition harm. The binary variable, measuring for potential monopolistic firms confirmed a 
positive association to segment disclosure, which controlled for the inverse expectation when industry 
concentration is close to its maximum. Finally, we also tested for the influence of labor power in the 
level of segment disclosures. Once again, we found a significant negative association, which improved 
under IFRS 8 adoption when estimating the model with full sample. If these results are strong when 
the full sample is used, the estimation of the model on key items reported by multi-segment firms 
revealed that, from the three proxies, only firms with higher abnormal profitability keep the negative 
association on both periods. This may suggest that, in general, the influence of a competitive harm 
environment, on lower level of items disclosure, decreases when firms already took the decision to 
desegregate their activities into business reportable segments. Furthermore, it may suggest that the 
referred negative influence is essentially related to firms’ decision to present themselves as single-
segment (non-disclosures). 
       
We therefore conclude that competitive harm is still an influence for lower segment disclosure under 
IFRS 8. Additionally, robustness tests for the sensibility of the model to the level of industry 
aggregation, generic industry classification and to the relevance of geographical disclosure, confirmed 
our main results. Thus, if with the new standard this negative relationship still persisted, we analyzed 
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in addiction, the potential partial effect of IFRS 8, separating the different categories of change. The 
analysis showed that firms with an increase on the number of business segments were significantly 
less related to abnormal profitability and labor power, under IAS 14R, than firms that did not change. 
This evidence seems to suggest that IFRS 8 did not have the expected enforcement effect on firms 
previously subject to competitive harm. On the other hand, we documented a significant association 
between firms that declined their level of key items and abnormal profitability growth. Once more, 
there is no evidence on the expected positive effect of IFRS 8.  
 
We think that our research evidences the null effect of IFRS 8 on reducing the influence of 
competitive harm in segment disclosures. We believe that our results are an important input for the 
IASB Group, responsible for the post-implementation review of IFRS 8, since they confirm the 
continuous practice of lower segment disclosure due to competition concerns. In the final report of the 
IASB Group (IASB, 2013b), investors responding to IFRS 8 implementation showed some concerns 
that operating segment are being inappropriately aggregated. Despite its recent adoption, IFRS 8 was 
targeted for potential adjustments, which seem to exalt the relevance and timing of researching on this 
issue. Thus, we believe that segment reporting is, nowadays, one of the most important topics of 
research on firms’ financial disclosure practices. Our results should work as an important contribution, 
not only to academic literature, but equally to accounting standard setters.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A – Sample comparison to similar literature 
Authors Stream of Research Sample Sizea Scope 
Thesis  Standard Adoption / Proprietary Costs 
1997 / 
1891 
IAS 14R + IFRS 8 (13 EU 
Countries) 
Literature on IAS/IFRS:    
- Street and Nichols (2002) Standard Adoption 210 IAS 14 + IAS 14R (multi-country) 
- Prather-Kinsey and Meek (2004) Standard Adoption 146 IAS 14 + IAS 14R (28 Countries) 
- Leuz (2004) Proprietary Costs 109 Voluntary IAS 14R (Germany) 
- Prencipe (2004) Proprietary Costs 64 Voluntary IAS 14R (Italy) 
- Nichols and Street (2007) Proprietary Costs 160 IAS 14R (multi-country) 
- Nichols et al. (2012) Standard Adoption 335 IFRS 8 (14 countries [12 EU]) 
- Crawford et al. (2012) Standard Adoption 150 IFRS 8 (UK) 
- Pisano and Landriani. (2012) Proprietary Costs 124 IAS 14R + IFRS 8 (Italy) 
Literature on SFAS (US):    
- Street et al. (2000) Standard Adoption 160 SFAS 14 + SFAS 131 (US) 
- Botosan and Harris (2005) Proprietary Costs 340 SFAS 14 + SFAS 131 (US) 
- Ettredge et al. (2006) Proprietary Costs 1293 SFAS 14 + SFAS 131 (US) 
- Berger and Hann (2007) Proprietary Costs 796 SFAS 14 + SFAS 131 (US) 
 
   
a Sample size is given by the largest number of firms-year. Tests of our competitive harm model are based on 
1860 firms in 2007 and 1891 firms in 2009. For standard adoption quantity analysis we used the full sample 
based on 1997 firms. Multi-country sample is a sample based on countries from different continents and for 
which, the information on the number of firms by each country was partially omitted.  
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Appendix B – Description and measurement of independent variables for the competitive harm model 
Abbreviations  Description Measurement Sign 
 
   
ABN_PROFIT Abnormal Profitability Firm ROA – Industry ROA, where ROA = Firm 
Operating Income / Total Assets 
- 
HERF Industry Concentration Herfindahl Index at a Two-Digit Industry Group - 
LAB_POW Labor Power Firm Labor Costs / Firm Revenue - 
ENT_BAR Entry Barriers Firm Net Value of PPE / Firm Total Assets + 
SIZE Size Natural Logarithm of Firm Total Assets + 
LEV Leverage Firm Debt / Firm Total Assets + 
FIRM_PROFIT Firm Profitability Firm ROA + 
LIST_INT Listing Status Dummy: Listed Internationally = 1 + 
IND_FIRM Monopoly Industry Dummy: Monopolistic Firm = 1 + 
 
 
Appendix C – Multinomial regression for business key items disclosure on multi-segment firms under 
IFRS 8 
VARIABLES 1 ITEM 2 ITEMS 3 ITEMS 4 ITEMS 
ABN_PROFIT_2D 2.609 ** 4.582 *** -0.576 -0.380 
HERF_2D 0.192 -0.420 -0.646 -0.193 
LAB_POW 0.869 ** -0.167 0.237 0.406  
ENT_BAR 0.168 -1.334 *** -0.045 -0.327 
SIZE -0.852 *** -1.005 *** -0.469 *** -0.081 
LEV -0.674 * 0.084 0.141 -0.584 
FIRM_PROFIT -1.786 -5.189 *** 0.367 -0.376 
LIST_INT -0.177 0.071 -0.172 0.213 
IND_FIRM_2D -2.161 ** -0.327 0.409 -0.094 
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Constant 1.541 5.332 *** 1.765 * -0.187 
*, **, ***, represents, respectively, statistical significant at 10% (p < 0.10), 5% (p < 0.05) and 1% (p < 0.01). 
Number of observations (firms) is 1420. LR Chi-Square is 261,62 (p < 0.01). Pseudo R2 of Cox & Snell is 0.168. 
Reference category represents full key items disclosures (firms with five key items).     
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix D – Regression results controlling the level of industry aggregation under IFRS 8 adoption 
VARIABLES BSEG_NUM1 
(ordered) 
BMULTISEG 
(binary) 
ITEMS_BS2 
(ordered) 
ITEMS_BS3 
(ordered) 
ABN_PROFIT_3D -1.852 *** -2.122 *** -1.871 *** -1.270 ** 
HERF_3D -0.440 ** -0.458 * -0.521 *** -0.474 ** 
LAB_POW -0.519 *** -0.650 *** -0.528 *** -0.306 
ENT_BAR -0.211 0.053 0.385 * 0.411 
SIZE 0.622 *** 0.642 *** 0.794 *** 0.670 *** 
LEV -0.007 -0.022 0.012 0.344 
FIRM_PROFIT 1.244 *** 1.423 *** 1.457 *** 1.395 ** 
LIST_INT -0.272 * -0.217 -0.083 -0.015 
IND_FIRM_3D 0.192 0.161 0.474 *** 0.519 *** 
Constant4 - -1.912 *** - - 
Number of Firms 1891 1891 1891 1420 
LR test 206,44 *** 160,07 *** 330,83 *** 198,92 *** 
Cox & Snell pseudo R2 0.103 0.081 0.161 0.129 
*, **, ***, represents, respectively, statistical significant at 10% (p < 0.10), 5% (p < 0.05) and 1% (p < 0.01). 
1 Ordinal regression with ordered categories from zero to three business segments, which meets the assumption 
of proportional odds (parallel lines test). Last category includes observations with three or more business 
segment number. 
2 Ordinal regression with three ordered categories of key items disclosure, which meets the assumption of 
proportional odds. Lower category includes observations of zero, one or two items. Second category for 
observations of three or four items and a higher category for full key items disclosure.  
3 Previous ordinal regression using a sub-sample of multi-segment firms. 
4 On ordinal regression we obtain constant values for the different categories, which are all significant at a 1% 
level, but not showed individually. 
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Appendix E – Regression results controlling for generic industry classification under IFRS 8 adoption 
VARIABLES BSEG_NUM1 
(ordered) 
BMULTISEG 
(binary) 
ITEMS_BS2 
(ordered) 
ITEMS_BS3 
(ordered) 
ABN_PROFIT_2D -1.643 *** -1.930 ** -3.465 *** -3.510 *** 
HERF_2D -0.785 *** -1.426 *** -0.605 *** -0.003 
LAB_POW -0.646 *** -0.740 *** -0.458 ** -0.169 
ENT_BAR -0.065 0.074 0.250 0.252 
SIZE 0.707 *** 0.743 *** 0.811 *** 0.676 *** 
LEV 0.405 * 0.120 0.210 0.318 
FIRM_PROFIT 1.129 * 1.312 2.979 *** 3.447 *** 
LIST_INT -0.293 * -0.248 0.024 0.157 
IND_FIRM_2D 0.566 * 0.597 0.732 ** 0.595 
Constant4 - -2.126 *** - - 
Number of Firms 1508 1508 1508 1155 
LR test 240,76 *** 165,41 *** 287,38 *** 166,27 *** 
Cox & Snell pseudo R2 0.148 0.104 0.174 0.134 
*, **, ***, represents, respectively, statistical significant at 10% (p < 0.10), 5% (p < 0.05) and 1% (p < 0.01). 
1 Ordinal regression with ordered categories from zero to six business segments, which meets the assumption of 
proportional odds (parallel lines test). Last category includes observations with six or more business segment 
number. 
2 Ordinal regression with three ordered categories of key items disclosure, which meets the assumption of 
proportional odds. Lower category includes observations of zero, one or two items. Second category for 
observations of three or four items and a higher category for full key items disclosure.  
3 Previous ordinal regression using a sub-sample of multi-segment firms. 
4 On ordinal regression we obtain constant values for the different categories, which are all significant at a 1% 
level, but not showed individually. 
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Appendix F – Regression results controlling for geographical relevance for lower business disclosure 
under IFRS 8 adoption 
VARIABLES BSEG_NUM1 
(ordered) 
BMULTISEG 
(binary) 
ITEMS_BS2 
(ordered) 
ITEMS_BS3 
(ordered) 
ABN_PROFIT_2D -2.364 *** -3.215 *** -3.379 *** -2.666 *** 
HERF_2D -1.043 *** -1.820 *** -0.541 ** 0.205 
LAB_POW -0.556 *** -0.724 *** -0.404 ** -0.089 
ENT_BAR -0.029 0.256 0.464 * 0.393 
SIZE 0.762 *** 0.930 *** 0.960 *** 0.787 *** 
LEV -0.017 -0.077 -0.006 0.310 
FIRM_PROFIT 1.814 *** 2.471 *** 3.299 *** 3.234 *** 
LIST_INT -0.136 0.057 -0.048 -0.076 
IND_FIRM_2D 0.589 * 0.667 0.604 * 0.450 
Constant4 - -2.756 *** - - 
Number of Firms 1675 1675 1675 1322 
LR test 293,96 *** 238,92 *** 409,17 *** 237,08 *** 
Cox & Snell pseudo R2 0.161 0.133 0.217 0.164 
*, **, ***, represents, respectively, statistical significant at 10% (p < 0.10), 5% (p < 0.05) and 1% (p < 0.01). 
1 Ordinal regression with ordered categories from zero to four business segments, which meets the assumption of 
proportional odds (parallel lines test). Last category includes observations with four or more business segment 
number. 
2 Ordinal regression with three ordered categories of key items disclosure, which meets the assumption of 
proportional odds. Lower category includes observations of zero, one or two items. Second category for 
observations of three or four items and a higher category for full key items disclosure.  
3 Previous ordinal regression using a sub-sample of multi-segment firms. 
4 On ordinal regression we obtain constant values for the different categories, which are all significant at a 1% 
level, but not showed individually. 
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Appendix G – Regression results controlling for correlation effect of firm profit under IFRS 8 
adoption 
VARIABLES BSEG_NUM1 
(ordered) 
BMULTISEG 
(binary) 
ITEMS_BS2 
(ordered) 
ITEMS_BS3 
(ordered) 
ABN_PROFIT_2D -0.656 *** -0.689 ** -0.615 ** -0.258 
HERF_2D -1.159 *** -1.771 *** -0.829 *** -0.083 
LAB_POW -0.615 *** -0.762 *** -0.684 *** -0.422 * 
ENT_BAR -0.049 0.190 0.456 ** 0.436 * 
SIZE 0.688 *** 0.718 *** 0.821 *** 0.678 *** 
LEV -0.009 -0.043 -0.010 0.252 
FIRM_PROFIT - - - - 
LIST_INT -0.120 0.028 -0.008 0.015 
IND_FIRM_2D 0.768 *** 0.805 ** 0.911 *** 0.685 * 
Constant4 - -1.944 *** - - 
Number of Firms 1891 1891 1891 1420 
LR test 259,76 *** 195,50 *** 328,53 *** 186,58 *** 
Cox & Snell pseudo R2 0.128 0.098 0.159 0.123 
*, **, ***, represents, respectively, statistical significant at 10% (p < 0.10), 5% (p < 0.05) and 1% (p < 0.01). 
1 Ordinal regression with ordered categories from zero to four business segments, which meets the assumption of 
proportional odds (parallel lines test). Last category includes observations with four or more business segment 
number. 
2 Ordinal regression with three ordered categories of key items disclosure, which meets the assumption of 
proportional odds. Lower category includes observations of zero, one or two items. Second category for 
observations of three or four items and a higher category for full key items disclosure.  
3 Previous ordinal regression using a sub-sample of multi-segment firms. 
4 On ordinal regression we obtain constant values for the different categories, which are all significant at a 1% 
level, but not showed individually. 
 
